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PALATALIZATION IN GRAMMATICAL WORDS AS REFLECTED IN UNCLASSIFIED LATE MIDDLE ENGLISH SOURCES

Abstract

Although palatalization changing [k] into [tʃ] was most widespread in Southumbria, the previous examination (Kocel 2009, 2010) has already proved that on no account can it be perceived as a homogeneous process. This lack of consistency is reflected in many instances of palatal forms found in the North alongside many nonpalatal ones encountered in the East Midlands and London. Consequently, the substantial number of such “odd” forms seems to defy the existence of clear-cut boundaries between the above mentioned areas, allowing for an unhindered influx and amalgamation of ostensibly dialect-specific variants. The problem appears even more complex, taking into account the vast collection of dialectally unidentified Middle English texts which, containing both palatal and nonpalatal forms, only corroborate the fact that palatalization could not be dialect or even area specific. The multitude of variants present in those texts, a result of the Scandinavian influence and dialectal borrowing, point to the process of the lexical diffusion of these forms across the whole English territory, affecting in particular such high-frequency items as the grammatical words each, much, such and which. The aim of the study, thus, will be to determine the extent of palatalization affecting these grammatical words, through the analysis of the spelling/phonological discrepancies and the distribution of each, much, such and which in unclassified Late Middle English sources. The data come from the Innsbruck Corpus of Middle English Prose, The Middle English Dictionary and A Linguistic Atlas of Late Mediaeval English.

1. Textual material

The current brief study concentrates on five texts from the Innsbruck Corpus of Middle English Prose, all dated to the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries. The list includes (a) Book of Quintessence classified as a cycle of treatises on
mediaeval medicine, (b) Early English Versions of the Gesta Romanorum, educational fiction and a morality fable, (c) English Gilds, consisting of legal ordinances and charters, (d) Prose Life of Alexander considered a historical romance and (e) Testament of Love classified as a “court of love” piece of writing. All the above are labelled in the corpus with an [x] signifying an ‘unknown’ original dialect, potentially a variegated mixture of features with a probable dominance of some variants.

The following two sections, thus, will contain an analysis of these texts as regards the grammatical words affected by palatalization in order to establish to what extent this process influenced their linguistic homogeneity.

2. Palatalization-consistent texts

One of the texts which could serve as an example of dialectal consistency with respect to palatalization is the Book of Quintessence, containing all four grammatical words observable only in their palatal forms as demonstrated in Figures 1 and 2:

![Fig. 1 The quantitative representation](image1.png)

![Fig. 2 The percentages of palatal of much, such, each and which and nonpalatal forms](image2.png)

Figure 1 above displays the grammatical words from the Book of Quintessence in the order of their frequency of occurrence: much (23), which (23), such (11) and each (6), all exhibiting only palatalized forms. The data concerning types of these forms, together with the percentages and numbers of their tokens (in parentheses) are summarized in Table 1:
Table 1. The distribution of palatal forms (percentages)

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MUCH</th>
<th>SUCH</th>
<th>EACH</th>
<th>WHICH</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>myche</td>
<td>91.3 (21)</td>
<td>siche 45.5 (5)</td>
<td>ech 50 (3)</td>
<td>pe which 65.2 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miche</td>
<td>8.7 (2)</td>
<td>sich 45.5 (5)</td>
<td>euerych 50 (3)</td>
<td>pe whiche 17.4 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>suche 9.0 (1)</td>
<td>which 13.0 (3)</td>
<td>which 13.0 (3)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>whiche 4.3 (1)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 confirms that the Book of Quintessence is, to a high degree, also homogeneous in the use of the particular variants, favouring *myche, sich(e)* and *which(e)* with the Old English definite article *þe*. Any changes in the forms result only from minor vowel alternations, final –*e* elision, presence or absence of the determiner or the compounding with *euer-*.

As for their distribution, the text does not seem to be systematic in the choice of the palatal forms, applying them injudiciously, as seen in the example below:

(1) (...) and to schewe euerych of þe forseid þing bi hem sylf; and þat is riȝt merueylous. I wole not leue for a litil to schewe a greet secreet, how ȝe may drawe out þe 5 beynge of ech of þe 4 elementis of al þe þingrehersid afore (...) (Book of Quintessence, p. 12)

Such a literary source, however, can hardly be perceived as representative of the group, one reason being its limited length, which makes it essential to examine a few typologically similar texts to draw any further conclusions.

### 3. Palatalization-inconsistent texts

In order to broaden the spectrum of the data “unknown” as to their origin, the following material includes the four other texts, namely *Early English Versions of the Gesta Romanorum, English Gilds, Prose Life of Alexander* and *Testament of Love* which, due to the comparative nature of the current analysis, will be first examined with respect to the quantitative balance of the grammatical words (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 shows that all four texts exhibit a slightly different balance of the grammatical words, with the *Gesta Romanorum* presenting the numerically determined order of *which, much, such* and *each, English Gilds*, of *each, which, such* and *much, Prose Life of Alexander*, of *which, each, much* and *such and Testament of Love*, of *which, such, much* and *each*. Interestingly, the
pronoun *which* seems to show the highest or almost the highest frequency in all the sources, which may affect the statistical results regarding palatalization and its range of influence. Figure 4 is a visualization of the extent of the process.

As can be inferred from the data above, none of the texts proves to be absolutely homogeneous with respect to palatalization, although the most consistent here appears to be the *Gesta Romanorum* with uniformly palatal variants (100%) of *such*, *each* and *which* and nonpalatal variants merely in *much*, with 12.2% of nonpalatal forms vs. 87.8% of palatal ones. The other three sources exhibit a varied palatal : nonpalatal ratio which in *English Gilds* and the *Prose Life of Alexander*, at least demonstrates consistency as to the quantitative preferences of either palatal or nonpalatal forms respectively. In this sense, the *Testament of Love* seems totally heterogeneous and quite unpredictable as regards the favoured variants and their use. The palatal : nonpalatal variation in other texts is as follows:

(a) *English Gilds*: *much* (82.6% vs. 17.4%), *such* (99.3% vs. 0.7%), *each* (70.8% vs. 29.2%), *which* (99.3% vs. 0.7%);
(b) the *Prose Life of Alexander*: *much* (0% vs. 100%), *such* (2.2% vs. 97.8%), *each* (4.3% vs. 95.7%), *which* (2.1% vs. 97.9%);
Out of all four word groups, the grammatical items proving the most consistent as to the type of forms used seem such and which, both generally favouring palatal variants. Considering the high frequency especially of which, it may contribute to the seemingly high dominance of such palatal forms and thus specific phonological tendencies in the text.

To understand the particularity of these tendencies, it is crucial, however, to take into account the specific forms employed in each text, which have been collated, together with their percentages and the number of tokens (in parenthesis) in the table below. The table also registers the noun mekilness in the Prose Life of Alexander which, however, has been excluded from the quantitative analysis.
Table 2. The distribution of palatal and nonpalatal forms in Early English Versions of the Gesta Romanorum, English Gilds, Prose Life of Alexander and Testament of Love

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MUCH</th>
<th>SUCH</th>
<th>EACH</th>
<th>WHICH</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Early English Versions of the Gesta Romanorum</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>moche 41.0 (94)</td>
<td>suche 37.9 (79)</td>
<td>eche 59.5 (47)</td>
<td>the whiche 26.7 (124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muche 24.9 (57)</td>
<td>suche 29.7 (62)</td>
<td>echon 17.7 (14)</td>
<td>þe whiche 24.8 (115)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mych 10.0 (23)</td>
<td>suche 24.9 (52)</td>
<td>eche 17.7 (14)</td>
<td>the which 22.4 (104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>moch 9.6 (22)</td>
<td>swiche 6.2 (13)</td>
<td>echone 1.3 (1)</td>
<td>þe whiche 9.1 (42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mekill 8.7 (20)</td>
<td>siche 0.5 (1)</td>
<td>ich 1.3 (1)</td>
<td>which 8.0 (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mekil 2.6 (6)</td>
<td>sich 0.5 (1)</td>
<td>iche 1.3 (1)</td>
<td>whiche 5.0 (23)</td>
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<tr>
<td>much 1.3 (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the wiche 2.2 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myche 0.9 (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>w[h]iche 0.6 (3)</td>
</tr>
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<td>mekille 0.4 (1)</td>
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<td>w[h]ich 0.4 (2)</td>
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<td>mekylle 0.4 (1)</td>
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<td>þe wiche 0.4 (2)</td>
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<td>(209)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td>(464)</td>
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<td><strong>English Gilds</strong></td>
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<td>moche 34.8 (8)</td>
<td>suche 45.0 (51)</td>
<td>euerch 20.8 (32)</td>
<td>which 24.1 (34)</td>
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<tr>
<td>meche 13.0 (3)</td>
<td>such 44.0 (50)</td>
<td>eueriche 19.5 (30)</td>
<td>þe wiche 12.8 (18)</td>
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<td>mikil 8.7 (2)</td>
<td>soche 4.4 (5)</td>
<td>ilk 8.4 (13)</td>
<td>wch 9.9 (14)</td>
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<td>swych 2.7 (3)</td>
<td>eche 7.8 (12)</td>
<td>the which 9.2 (13)</td>
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<td>swiche 1.8 (2)</td>
<td>ilke 7.1 (11)</td>
<td>quiche 4.3 (6)</td>
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<td>qwiche 4.3 (6)</td>
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<td>mekyl 4.3 (1)</td>
<td>swilk 0.9 (1)</td>
<td>euerilk 5.2 (8)</td>
<td>the wiche 4.3 (6)</td>
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<td>(18)</td>
<td>iche 5.2 (8)</td>
<td>qwch 3.5 (5)</td>
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<td>euerych 4.5 (7)</td>
<td>qwych 3.5 (5)</td>
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<td>whych 2.8 (4)</td>
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<td>ech 2.6 (4)</td>
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<td>wiche 2.1 (3)</td>
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<td>the wiche 1.4 (2)</td>
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<td>whche 1.4 (2)</td>
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<td>qwicheuer 0.7 (1)</td>
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<td>the qwilk 0.7 (1)</td>
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<td>ych 0.6 (1)</td>
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<td>þe whiche 0.7 (1)</td>
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As Table 2 demonstrates, all four texts show slightly different preferences for the forms of the grammatical words and varying frequencies of their use. The most frequent palatal variants seem moche, such(e), eche, euerich(e) and which(e), whereas nonpalatal ones include mekil(l), swilk(e), ilk(e) and þe whilke. The main discrepancies between the variants stem from vowel and consonant alternation, presence or absence of final [-e], geminates [ll] and [nn], variation in the initial cluster of [qw-], [qu-], [wh] and [w], occurrence of the determiner the/Pelye before which, spelling variation, compounding (with initial euer-, ever-, ouer-, (in-)-as-, for-as-, in-so-, or final on(e), -an(n)(e), -euer and -folde) and, evidently, palatalization affecting here all the word groups. The table also registers some interesting forms such as mokel, mokil, mekills, sucbi, wicth accounted for in neither LALME nor

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<th>(23)</th>
<th>(113)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Prose Life of Alexander</strong></td>
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<td>mekill 93.5 (43)</td>
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<td>swilke 62.2 (28)</td>
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<td>euer-ilkanne 1.4 (1)</td>
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| **Testament of Love** |      |       |       |       |
| mokel 43.1 (47) |      |       |       |       |
| moche 36.7 (40) |      |       |       |       |
| mikel 6.4 (7) |      |       |       |       |
| mokil 5.5 (6) |      |       |       |       |
| moch 2.8 (3) |      |       |       |       |
| in-as-moche 1.8 (2) |      |       |       |       |
| mokil 0.9 (1) |      |       |       |       |
| moche-folde 0.9 (1) |      |       |       |       |
| for-as-moch 0.9 (1) |      |       |       |       |
| for-as-moche 0.9 (1) |      |       |       |       |
| (109) |      |       |       |       |
| suche 88.3 (211) |      |       |       |       |
| such 11.3 (27) |      |       |       |       |
| sucbi 0.4 (1) |      |       |       |       |
| (239) |      |       |       |       |
| ilk 61.5 (16) |      |       |       |       |
| everch 23.1 (6) |      |       |       |       |
| everiche 15.4 (4) |      |       |       |       |
| (26) |      |       |       |       |
| whiche 81.9 (199) |      |       |       |       |
| whiche 16 (39) |      |       |       |       |
| the whiche 1.6 (4) |      |       |       |       |
| the whiche 0.4 (1) |      |       |       |       |
| (243) |      |       |       |       |
MED and representing some accidental and unintentional spelling variation as in the case of the last three examples or a deliberate change in the word form observable in the first two variants.

Even more interesting issue concerns the distribution of palatal and nonpalatal forms across the texts themselves. Although the *Gesta Romanorum* gives an impression of consistency regarding the employment of the variants, it also reveals some noticeable traces of exterior influences. Its first part is dominated by only palatal forms, with *mochе* occupying pages up to 95, then yielding to *muche* and for some reason appearing again together with the latter on page 117. The neat order seems to break down from page 312 onwards where both palatal *mochе* and nonpalatal *mekell* begin to alternate, but still not in a close vicinity of each other. The situation gets more complicated from page 361 onwards where *muche* changes into *mych* and is used alongside *mekill* up to page 417 where both forms suddenly appear right next to each other. Obviously, due to the fact that other grammatical words exhibit only palatal tokens, the nonpalatal forms of *much* occur together with the latter throughout the whole text, which is demonstrated in the examples below:

(2a) (...) the byshope *mych* worshipped the Eyre, for he desyred *mekill* the maner. he made this Eyre to sitte with hym at his borde, in mete tyme, and did hym *mych* worship; (*Gesta Romanorum*, p. 417)

(b) (...) wherfore *suchе* one oweth *mekell* to sorow, and alway wepe. The keper of the prison is the develle, that *suchе* one hathe sette faste (...) (*Gesta Romanorum*, p. 336)

A slightly different scheme can be drawn for *English Gilds* where the nonpalatal variants seem to occupy the first part of the text (pages 46–117), with only *mikil* appearing twice at its end, and are interspersed with occasional palatal forms, especially of *each*, which, however, occur in the close vicinity of each other merely in a few cases, as seen in the example below:

(3) (...) if ye Deen falie of his somouns, he shal paye, for *ilk* a broyere and sistere nouht somound, to ye amendement of ye li3t, j.d And also ordeynd it is, yat *eueriche* broyere and sistere shal paie, at *eueriche* morunspeche, (...) (*English Gilds*, p. 103)

Still, a dramatically opposite situation is presented in the *Prose Life of Alexander* where the few palatal variants are found on only three pages, from 46 to 48, and are not accompanied by their nonpalatal equivalents. The latter are evenly interspersed across the rest of the text, without much care as to the consistency of their choice, though, as indicated by the examples below:
(4a) And Alexander, seeing them with each other in talk, knew they were speaking of him and he was known. (...) And taking a blazing torch from a Persian’s hand, himself mounted his palfrey, which he found ready out side (...) (Prose Life of Alexander, p. 47)

(b) Now may þou see that þou lye3, And þare-fore þou arte worthy to hafe swilke a dede.’ And than Anectanabus ansuerd, & said: ’I wyste wele ynoghe,’ quoþ he, ’þat I scholde die swylke a dede. (Prose Life of Alexander, p. 8)

On the other hand, the Testament of Love shows an even distribution of both types of variants across the whole text, with palatal and nonpalatal much existing alongside each other, accompanied by the palatal which and such, due to the lack of their nonpalatal counterparts, as well as palatal and nonpalatal each. Curiously, while much allows for the alternation of its both equivalents, sometimes even in the same line, each seems to be used more consciously, favouring the employment of either its palatal or nonpalatal forms and not juxtaposing them against one another. This situation is illustrated by the examples below:

(5a) (...) in ful of thoughty studye to plesaunce, mater in bringinge comfort everiche to other. And therfore, of erthly thinges, mokel mater lightly cometh in your lerning. (Testament of Love, p. 78)

(b) After moche clatering, there is mokil rowning. (Testament of Love, p. 23)

The configuration of the grammatical words displayed in all four texts contributes to the complexity of palatalization, showing hardly any regularities in the application of the process and therefore defying any conscious use of the variants on the part of the writers themselves, representing either a stylistic device or their linguistic awareness. This, in turn, only confirms the assumption made earlier that if even texts unidentified as to their place of origin and speech variety point to the unpredictability and inconsistency of palatalization, the whole phonological phenomenon cannot be perceived as dialect or even area bound, thus challenging the concept of any linguistic boundaries and justifying the free circulation of all the dialectal forms.

4. Conclusions

1. Although the corpus registers some linguistically homogeneous texts, the presence of other dialectally unidentified sources defying homogeneity with respect to palatalization, testifies to a much more complex character of the process.
2. Out of the five texts chosen for the analysis, four exhibit both palatal and nonpalatal forms, with a varied ratio of their occurrences, depending on the source.

3. The most frequent palatal forms encountered in all five texts are *moche, myche, such(e), which(e), ech(e)* and *euerich(e)*, while the nonpalatal ones include *mekil(l), swilk(e), ilk(e)* and *be whilke*.

4. The grammatical word with the highest frequency of use seems *which*, proving also the most consistent in the employment of its either palatal or nonpalatal variants. On the other hand, as regards types of tokens within the palatal or nonpalatal group, this grammatical word generally exhibits the broadest variety of forms across both categories.

5. The texts also contain variants not accounted for in either LALME or MED and these include *mokel, mokil, mekills, sucbi* and *wicth*.

6. The occurrence of both palatal and nonpalatal forms alongside each other proves the lack of consistency and homogeneity of the phonological process, also in the case of dialectally unidentified sources.

7. The unpredictable and heterogeneous character of palatalization in the texts of obscure origin only corroborates the assumption that the phenomenon cannot be dialect or even area specific, accounting for the unhindered diffusion of dialectal words across the merely conventional boundaries.

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THE GERUNDIAL CONSTRUCTION IN A DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVE: PAST AND PRESENT*

Abstract

In Modern English the gerund, historically a nominalized verb in –ung(e), is marked by a gradient of increasing verbalization, from full noun (the reading of the book) to nearly full verbalization (... John having read his essay very carefully), which is due to morphological syncretism in Early Middle English with the present participle in –ind(e). It is demonstrated that this (re)verbalization can be traced diachronically from its incipient phase to Modern English. It also allows us to fine-tune our terminology as to the most recent stage in terms of verbalized or verbal gerund, which at first sight seems to be a contradictio in terminis. In light of the data it is argued that –ing forms after verbs of perception (We saw him working in the garden) can also be interpreted as (semi-)gerunds, featuring at the extreme right of the gradient; “semi-”, because such structures lack one nominal property, viz. the genitival subject (...*his working in the garden). The historical history and development of the gerund in English can be described as a triadic process: VERB – NOUN – VERB.

1. The gerund revisited

In present-day linguistics the category of the gerund in all its facets is very well defined; see, e.g., Huddleston (1984: 312–317). Yet for the present purposes we need to recapitulate some of its major characteristics. Given its verbal roots, the gerund is best defined as a nominalized verb in –ing. By definition, gerunds can only function in nominal slots, which is in sharp contrast with the homomorphous present participle. Syntagmatically their potential is very varied and rich in English, ranging from fully noun-like properties to fully verb-like ones, as shown in the gradient below, based on Dekeyser, e.a. (2008: 319–320).
I suggest taking *appreciate* as the main verb, which can select a gerundial clause as its complement.

I appreciate

Type A

(1) the deft solving (...)
(2) the deft solving of the political crisis
(3) ? the president’s solving of the political crisis

Type B

OBJECT (4) *the (deft) solving the political crisis
(5) the president’s / his solving the political crisis
ADV (6) the president’s / his solving the political crisis deftly
AUX (7) the president’s / his having solved the political crisis deftly

Type C

NON-GEN (8) the president / him having solved the crisis deftly

Note that by NON-GEN is meant either an unmarked noun or a personal pronoun in the accusative.

The syntactic features of the gerundial construction can also be presented in a matrix:

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Though derived from verbs, nouns in –*ing* with concrete meanings such as *drawing* ‘picture’, etc. or *handling* ‘act of dealing with’, etc. are normally not included in the category of the gerund; see amongst others Lees (1964: 64–65).

In (1–3) the gerunds are all fully nominalized, with a determiner, an adjective and, possibly, also an *of*-object. In present-day English the use of (3) is very much constrained. Yet in the prescriptive tradition of the 19th
century it used to be recommended as the only “correct” form, given the nominal status of the gerund; see Dekeyser (1975: 169–177). I shall have to return to this matter later in this paper, more particularly in Section 3 at the end.

From Type A to B we are transgressing the noun/verb-like borderline. First, direct objects governed by a gerund + DET/ADJ do not at all occur in the English of these days. By contrast, gerundial constructions with no overt subject or a “subject” in the genitive case are and have always been compatible with verbal attributes, such as objects (5), adverbs (6) and all kinds of auxiliaries (7). Actually, all of them are syntactic hybrids.

Type C, then, exemplified in (8) above, only shows verb-like properties and was not accepted as “good usage” for a very long time.

The gradient of increasing verb-like patterning is also marked by an underlying evolutionary dimension, which helps us to understand the remarkable flexibility and dynamics of the English gerund as a “bi-polar category”, both noun and verb. This matter will be looked into in the following sections and actually constitutes the bulk of this paper.

2. An excursion into the past

Just like any other Germanic language, Old English (OE) had nominalized verbs with the suffix –ung/-ing: langung ‘longing’. They were exclusively used as full nouns and, unlike the gerundial constructions in the post-OE periods, they did not govern any verb-like complement. Typologically, they are precisely the same as present-day reading ‘the act of a person who reads’, etc., briefing ‘a meeting at which information is given’, etc., handling ‘approach, method’, etc., or Dutch lezing ‘lecture’, tekening ‘drawing’ and many more, German Ernennung ‘appointment’.

Here follow a few examples, all of them cited in Visser (1966: 1065–1066):

(1) Aelfric, Hom. I, (1, 18 ða wæs gefylled Hieremias witegung (verb witegian).
[then was fulfilled Jeremiah’s prophecy]

(2) Aelfred, Bede (Smith) 605, ii To digolnesse and to stilnesse becom ðære godcundan sceawunget ancorlifes. (verb sceawian)
[came to the privacy and solitude of the divine contemplation of an anchoret’s life]

(3) Aelfred, Bede (Smith) 407, i He ongean arweorthian ða drowunge haligra martyra. (verb drowian)
[He began to honour the suffering of the holy martyrs]
In (1) the gerund is the subject, in (2) an inflected adjective occurs, while in (3) the gerundial subject is in the genitive case.

Visser (1966: 1068) also mentions a few cases of an –unɡ/-ing form followed by a direct object, but he rightly notes that these are translations from a Latin verbal form in –(i)endo or a Latin infinitive.

(4) *Vesp. Ps.* 118, 9 in **haldunge** word ðin [in custodiendo sermones tuos].

However interesting these examples are, for the development of the modern gerund Middle English is the crucial “locus of change”, here English parts company with other Germanic languages like Dutch and German.

The first two centuries of Middle English were characterized by a bewildering medley of gerundial and participial suffixes, into the description of which we cannot go here. Moreover, we do not need to, since this issue is abundantly documented in the relevant literature. So, to cut a long and complex story short, we can confine ourselves to the very essentials. In the Southern dialects a present participle with –*ind(e)* prevailed; the dental stop tended to be weakened and consequently dropped. Because of the (near) identity with the gerund (–*ing*) syncretism of these verbal forms was the eventual outcome, coupled with or followed by the gerund acquiring the capacity of patterning as a verb, which it borrowed from the participle. That this structural innovation began in the South, with its –*inde* participles, is more than a matter of sheer coincidence. Here correlation is undeniably causation (or *cum hoc ergo propter hoc*). Two examples from Visser (1966: 1096) may suffice here:

(5) Langland, *P.Pl.* B XIV, 186 Confession and **crauyng** thy merci shulde amende vs.

(6) Wyclif, *Hebr.* 12 **Casting** out fendis.

Such “verbalized” gerunds could and did retain their noun-like properties, even the use of the definite article as in (7), which is ungrammatical in present-day English.

(7) Shoreham, *Poems* 84, 153 Hyt was y-bore To the **beryynge** that noble corps of ihesu cryst. (Visser 1966: 1097)

In the following sections I shall deal in some more detail with the development of the verb-like potential of the gerundial construction resulting from syncretism.
2.1 Direct objects and adverbials

Typologically Middle English marks the transition from the traditional (OE) SOV word order to Modern English SVO. Hence we come across examples of both OV (8–9) and VO (140), cited by Mustanoja (1960: 574–575), and also in (1) above:

(8) *Body and Soul* 375, Laud MS mercy *criende* lutel availede.

(9) Langland, *PPl*. B vii 87 usage ... of seyntes lyves *redynge*

(10) Chaucer, *CT* H Mcp. 67 in *lifting* up his hevy drunken cors.

And these are two examples for the gerund with an adverbial (also from Mustanoja 1960: 575):


(12) Chaucer, *CT* I Par. 620 swich *cursynge* wrongfully retorneth again to him that curseth.

In these examples the use of direct objects (in whichever position) and of adverbials is clear evidence that the gerund is taking on verbal properties in Middle English.

2.2 Auxiliaries

The available data suggest that complex verb phrases with *have* for the perfect tense and *be* for the passive voice were still in an incipient phase in Late Middle English, if occurring at all. Such phrases fully developed in Early Modern English; again see Mustanoja (1960: 573):

(13) Shakespeare, *Ven.* 810 Mine eares... Do burne them selues, for *hauing* so offended.

(14) Ellis, *Letters* II i 59 ...may suffer their goods and cattels to remayne in the feilds (sic) day and night without *being* stolen.

Here the main verb of the gerundial construction appears in the form of an –*ed* or an –*ing* participle as the lexical verb at the end of the phrase, while the auxiliaries have become the markers for the gerund. As such, it matches (finite or non-finite) complex verb phrases with an auxiliary marked for tense, aspect, etc. followed by the main verb in a participial form. Once again,
examples like these provide convincing evidence for the ongoing verbalization of the gerund from ca. 1500.

2.3 The “subject” of the gerund: genitives and non-genitives

Hundreds of pages (literally) have been devoted to this controversial issue, first in an overwhelmingly normative, even outright prescriptive strain (mainly during the 19th century, but also in the early 20th century), then more recently in a scholarly descriptive approach.

In Old English, with gerunds as full nouns, the subject was invariably expressed in the genitive, either preceding or following the –ung/-ing form; see examples (1–3) above.

In Middle English the genitival subject was normally preserved even after the syncretism of the gerundial and participial categories, as evidenced by the following two examples in Visser (1966: 1166):

(15) c1300 King Alys. (Laud MS) 2901 Mury hit is in sonnes risynge.

(16) c1366 Chaucer A B C 130 my Fadres chastisynge... dar I nought abiden.

In the next example, also from Visser (1966: 1168), a possessive pronoun is used:

(17) c1377 Langland P. Pl. B XIV, 141 It semeth nought that ye shulle Haue heuene in yowre here being and heuene her after.

According to Mustanoja (1960: 574) unmarked nouns have been recorded since the beginning of the 14th century. However, he admits that several of the earliest attestations “are somewhat doubtful”. In this context the juxtaposition of the following two examples in (18), providing the same text of two different versions from the same source, is quite interesting (Mustanoja (1960: 574):

(18) K. Alis 2883 MS L mury it is in sonne rising; mery it is in sonnes risynge MS B 2897

Below another example from Visser (1966: 1177) is adduced:

(19) c1438 Bk. Marg. Kempe 164, 7 that the eyr beyng bright & cler shulde be so sone chongyd...

Relevant material proves pronouns in the accusative to be a late 15th century innovation, i.e. nearly 200 years after the introduction of unmarked
nouns; see Visser (1966: 1183). In the subsequent centuries, too, up to ca. 1800, instances tended to be scarce. Here are a few, again from Visser (1966: 1183):

(20) 1477 Caxton, *Prol. to Life of Jason* (Blades) 140 Moost humble besekyng my sayd most drad souerayn...to pardon me so *presuming* (Kellner).

(21) 1589 George Puttenham, *The Arte of Poesie* (Arber) 172 I trust they will beare with me *writing* in the vulgar speech.

(22) 1749 Fielding, *Tom Jones* (Everyman) XVI, V though she had not expressly forbidden me *writing*, yet that must be an omission from forgetfulness.

My 19\textsuperscript{th} century data (Dekeyser 1975: 179–189) show a steady and significant increase of unmarked nouns throughout this century, whereas the frequency of accusative personal pronouns, though slowly rising, remains rather restricted, i.e. ca. 5%. It is worth pointing out that all but a few 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} century grammarians categorically reject the non-genitive expression on the ground that gerunds are nominals and so require a subject in the genitive; some of them even insist on using the objects as *of*-phrases; again, see Dekeyser (1975: 169–177). In present-day English non-genitives seem to be firmly established, though apparently less so in more formal English (Lees 1968: 72, Huddleston 1984: 221), which may well be put down to the lingering impact of the earlier normative or prescriptive tradition.

In what follows I shall briefly examine the factors that may have given rise to the use of non-genitives.

One factor that must have contributed to the spread of unmarked forms are nouns with inanimate denotations, which normally do not take the genitival suffix. Yet prescriptive grammarians, such as Murray, whose extremely popular and widespread *English Grammar* was first published in 1795, used to insist on: “Much depends on the rule’s being observed”, instead of “the rule being observed”, cited in Dekeyser (1975: 170), which no native speaker is likely to use these days. In this context it is worth noting that no less an author than Jane Austen consistently complied with the grammarians’ dicta in nearly all the examples I recorded for my corpus (Dekeyser 1975: 184)\textsuperscript{3}. And here is Visser (1966: 1167), once again, who cites an interesting instance on that score (23):

(23) 1811 Jane Austen, *Sense & Sensibility* 238 Elinor was prevented ... by the door’s *being* thrown open.

Next, most indefinite pronouns, if not all, have no genitive case at all: *each, some, both, either*, etc.; this also holds for complex phrases like *either of us, all of them*, etc. For details see Jespersen (1965: 124–125).
In particular contexts sentences can be “pragmatically ambiguous”. Let us look at just two examples:

(24) I’ll always remember Mary / her **complaining** about her health all the time.

(25) I’ve always disagreed with John / him **pretending** the holocaust has never occurred.

Strictly speaking, it is arguable that Mary / her and John / him can function respectively as a direct object (24) or a prepositional complement (25); in this case the –ing forms are predicative complements. Conversely, in a given context such –ing forms could and did shift to gerunds: “What do I remember?” or “What have I disagreed with?” Cases like these are pragmatic issues, which must have resulted in the increasingly common occurrence of non-genitives through time. Such structures were then analogically extended to contexts where the predicative complement interpretation has to be ruled out, which is mostly the case. Example (22) above is an unambiguous one in this respect; in my interpretation that also holds for (20) and (21).

But why then do these pronouns occur in the objective case instead of the nominative? It is arguable that this is due to the “range” of the immediately preceding transitive verb or preposition, which seem to “govern” them. A very telling example can be found in Visser (1966: 1184):

(26) 1667 *Pepys’s Diary*, May 26 That they may not have what I have built against my will in case of me and my brother’s **being** without heirs male.

Here of seems to govern the adjacent pronoun but apparently not the more remote noun.

Another argument in favour of this “governing” theory is the very fact that gerundial constructions in subject function are not normally compatible with accusative forms as their “subject”:

(27) His (?him) **being** unable to attend the meeting was not accepted as an excuse.

In addition, the homomorphy of the objective and genitive forms of feminine her must undoubtedly have contributed to the expansion of gerunds with an accusative “subject” as well.

3. Back to the gradient as an evolutionary sequence

The gerundial constructions given under Type A are rooted in the Old English tradition and even beyond (Germanic); they are all cases of fully nominalized verbs. The crucial innovations took place in the course of ME,
when gerunds and present participles in –*ind(e)* morphologically coalesced; as pointed out earlier, this period was the “locus of change”.

Type B presents a survey, in broad chronological order, of the ever increasing “verbalization” of the gerund through time. Constructions like (ungrammatical) (4) were common from the 14th century on and throughout the Late ME period and Early Modern English. Visser (1966: 1217) quotes an extensive passage from Henry Sweet’s well-known *English Grammar*, 1898, II, 105:

(28) In the last example the pluperfect is used by the fact that the going for a walk preceded seeing the donkey, and it is used here because the seeing the donkey is the really important event.

This seems to suggest that the direct object construction was still more or less firmly established in the English of that time. However, since the beginning of the 20th century gerunds complemented with a direct object and preceded by the definite article seem to have gone out of use. Visser’s latest quotation dates from 1905 (Visser 1966: 1217):


Direct objects and adverbials overall, Type B (5) and (6), also emerged simultaneously with the “new” gerund; see examples (8–12). Complex gerundial VPs with an auxiliary, Type B (7), began to be used from Late ME to gain momentum in the course of Early Modern English; see examples (13–14).

Type C shows the full verbalization of the gerund, obviously apart from its nominal function in the sentence. Unmarked nouns in subject position instead of the traditional genitives are also a feature of Late Middle English just like the auxiliaries; see examples (18–19). By contrast, subject pronouns in the objective case only began to trickle in the course of the late 15th century, and were scarcely attested even in Early Modern English; see examples (20–22). It needs to be stressed here that these constitute the latest innovation in the verbalization process, which now seems to have reached full completion. The gradient unmistakably shows an ever increasing verbalization through time of an originally nominalized verb from noun-like to verb-like. The wheel has come full circle.

One case in the gradient (see p. 18) has not been gone into thus far. While (4) is definitely ungrammatical in present-day English, (3) is not, at least in a particular context. Lees (1968: 64) rightly observes that there are two different semantic types of gerundial constructions: a nominal one and a gerundive one.
Let us look at the following carefully chosen sentences; the examples are mine, the comment is based on Lees (1968: 64–67).

(30) His **reciting** of Shakespeare’s *Sonnets* was appreciated by the entire audience, because he did it so impressively.

(31) His **reciting** Shakespeare’s *Sonnets* was appreciated by the entire audience, because he hardly knew English.

The comment given in the *because*-clause is vital. Example (30) expresses an action, a way of doing something, and can nearly always be paraphrased as:

(32) The way (that) he recites...

Conversely, (31) expresses a fact and is paraphrasable as:

(33) The fact that he recites...

Action nominals (see p. 18) as in (2) are fully nominalized gerunds as contrasted with what Lees (1968: 71–72) calls the “gerundive” nominal. Consequently, action nominals are only compatible with an *of*-object (if a transitive verb is involved), as in (30) above, and modifying elements are adjectives, never adverbs. So in the same example the adjective *beautiful* could be inserted (*His beautiful reciting of...*), while *beautifully* is ungrammatical here: *His reciting of... beautifully...*

This matter has been thoroughly and definitively looked into by Lees (1968) and also Declerck (1991: 495–501), so we do not have to enter into another detailed analysis. Just one minor remark on Declerck (1991: 497) can be made. He labels all the gerunds that I have subsumed under B and C “nonnominalized”, although he frankly admits at the same time that the term “is not quite accurate”. Actually it is a *contradictio in terminis*: all gerunds are nominalized one way or another. In light of the (hopefully convincing) diachronic evidence presented in this paper “verbalized gerund” is more appropriate, at least the way I see it, or for that matter simply “verbal gerund”, as opposed to the “nominal gerund”.

Typically, some action nominals like *handling*, *dealing* or *killing* have acquired lexical status in that they nowadays feature as lexical items in English dictionaries, designated as “noun” or just “n.”, which seems to indicate that lexicographers tend to regard them as nouns in their own right. They lie towards the boundary between –*ing* nouns with concrete denotation (*her writings*, etc.) and Lees’ action nominals proper.
4 In retrospect

In this contribution I have attempted to demonstrate that a diachronic approach to the gerundial construction, however superficial and concise, contributes to a better understanding of it. As pointed out earlier more than once, as a category the gerund is characterized by a noun/verb polarity that emerged and gained momentum in the course of Middle English and also Early Modern English, and which underlies its remarkable flexibility and broad functionality unlike comparable structures, say in Dutch or German.

It is clear that the history and development of the gerund in English as a whole can best be captured in terms of a triadic evolutionary process: VERB – NOUN – VERB.

5 Epilogue: the –ing form with verbs of perception

Finally I want to briefly address the –ing form governed by verbs of perception and some others. All but a few grammarians, including Declerck (1991: 460–461), analyse them as present participles. I shall argue in this subsection that there are good grounds to assume that they can also be regarded as a separate gerundial type in a specific interpretation, at least when verbs of perception are involved.

Let us start from the following examples:

(34) a. We saw him perform Molière on the beach.
    b. We saw him performing Molière on the beach.

    Prima facie, it looks as if (34a) and (34b) only differ in terms of grammatical aspect. Indeed, the subclause in (34a) focuses on the performance as such, while (34b) stresses the ongoingness or progressiveness of it.

    But things are not that simple. The classical “litmus test” to discover the direct object is asking either a what or a who question. Now it unmistakably appears that, whereas (34a) only allows what, (34b) can be an appropriate answer to both of them, which is also borne out by two possible paraphrases:

(35) a. We saw him while he was performing... (whom...?)
    b. We saw that/how he was performing... (what...?)

    It can be inferred from this that paraphrase (35a) proves that him in (34b) can be interpreted as the object modified by a participial object complement. By contrast, paraphrase (35b) shows the entire structure him performing Molière on the beach to function as the direct object, and so has to be taken as a gerundial clause filling a nominal (object) slot in much the same way as:
(36) Do you mind him performing Molière ...?

However, there is one major syntactic constraint on the latter interpretation: the syntactic property of using a subject in the genitive is ruled out with –ing forms complementing verbs of perception:

(37) *We saw his performing Molière...

Yet there is no denying that, apart from this constraint, there are good grounds to regard these –ing forms as nominals. However, seeing that one feature of the gerundial construction is lacking, I suggest using the term “semi-gerund”.

Now, how can we possibly account for the non-occurrence of subjects in the genitive? For one thing, the unmarked noun and/or accusative pronoun as in (34a) may well affect the choice of the form of the subject used in –ing clauses like the one in (34b), given their near grammatico-semantic equivalence. In addition, the dichotomic analysis as presented in (35ab) actually suggests an underlying functional ambivalence: both object of the main verb and subject of the –ing clause (so, who and what), which probably precludes genitival forms throughout. This then provides us with another plausible argument to refer to these –ing forms as semi-gerunds.

For the sake of completeness we should also look at some other verbs complemented with –ing forms in exactly the same way as verbs of perception are. These are: catch, discover, find (physical discovery of a presence), keep, leave, send, start and have (in a causative meaning); see Dekeyser et al. (2008: 316–317). The analysis used above cannot be applied here, because neither the what question nor the that clause paraphrase can be used as relevant parameters. In most cases the object complement analysis is the more plausible one, as in:

(38) She caught him stealing wheat from the barn. (while he was stealing...).

(39) The patrolman found the asylum seekers wandering in Central Station. (in the process (of wandering).

In other cases though, these constructions resist any straightforward analysis in terms of parsing:

(40) I’ll have you walking again in three weeks, the doctor said.

(41) The teacher’s words of praise set me dreaming.

The most acceptable and consistent solution here is just to take them as sui generis constructions.
Now that we have worked out a survey of the gerundial construction in a diachronic perspective and extended our discussion to verbs of perception, I propose the following adjusted terminology scale:

(--ing nouns) —– nominal gerunds —– verbalized gerunds — semi-gerunds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type A</th>
<th>Types B + C</th>
<th>Type D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

As observed at the beginning, --ing nouns with concrete meanings do not qualify here. Lees (1968: 64) refers to “our” Type A as “action nominal” as compared with “gerundive nominal” for types B and C. This does not seem to be very consistent; “action nominal” is a semantic category; but how then are we to understand “gerundive”? The term “verbalized” is more to the point; for convenience’s sake, it can be replaced with “verbal”, or even simply “gerund”. At the extreme right end we find the semi-gerund, ranging intermediately between full gerunds and present participles, which, as a matter of course, fall outside the scope of this scale; see examples (38–41) above. Needless to stress that this scale, once again, reflects the development of increasing verbalization of an originally fully nominalized verb through time.

So the fine-tuning bears both on the use of “verbal(ized) gerund” and the extension of the gerundial construction to what I have called “semi-gerund”. *Quod scripsi, scripsi.*

NOTES

* The present article is a slightly adjusted and extended version of a contribution which originally appeared in the Festschrift offered to Renaat Declerck (KU Leuven): Cappelle B. and Wada N. (eds.) 2010. *Distinctions in English Grammar Offered to Renaat Declerck*; see list of references below.

1 This paper does not draw on any primary linguistic material. Nearly all of the examples have been selected from Visser’s *Historical Syntax* and Mustanoja’s *Middle English Syntax*, both of them treasure-troves to the historical linguist. I have preserved these authors’ references to their sources as such.

2 As most of you may not be familiar with the Old English language, I have chosen simple and, at the same time, relevant examples, supplemented with a Modern English version in order to make them more accessible. Also note that *th-* , whether voiced or voiceless, is spelled in Old English either with “thorn” or with “eth” δ; for practical reasons I have used the latter. Finally, to render the somewhat fronted OE /a/ the usual ligature ash æ is used. As to understanding, Middle English does not present any particular difficulties, so translations have been omitted. In addition, all the relevant phrases/clauses in the examples are printed in italics.

3 The pervasive prescriptivism, which may well have influenced Jane Austen in her writings, emerged in the course of the 18th century and was continued into the subsequent century and even beyond. A major landmark in this tradition was Lindley Murray’s *English Grammar* (1795), with its innumerable reprints and enlarged editions. See Dekeyser (1975) and, as to the 18th century, also Leonard (1929).
4 It ought to be pointed out that Henry Sweet was the very first truly descriptive grammarian in the history of English grammar writing; see Dekeyser (1975: *passim*) on that score.

5 Dekeyser at al. (2008: 318) refer to this *ing* form as a “quasi-gerund”. With the benefit of hindsight, I now consider “semi-gerund” a more accurate term, as “quasi-gerund” tends to evoke a rather negative connotation: indeed, semi-gerunds are more than mere quasi-gerunds.

6 A shorter embryonic version of this paper was first read at the “Colloque International – Laboratoire C.O.R.P.U.S”, Universite´ d’ Amiens, on 26 March 2009.

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Abstract

The article contains an analysis and conclusions concerning the meaning of contemporary social slogans in the light of Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (1995) and the so-called Epistemic Vigilance discussed amongst others by Mascaro and Sperber (2009). The text begins with a presentation of the state of art of the contemporary research of slogans commonly existing in the social, economic and political spheres of life of modern societies. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of selected social slogans originating from billboards of the most popular social campaigns emphasising the innovative character of research and the significance of new theories in linguistic practice. The conclusion states the role of Epistemic Vigilance in comprehension of the often deceptive character of advertising campaigns.

1. Introduction

Relevance is understood as the opportunity of attaining a certain cognitive result. It is an issue of degree. Relevance diverges with two aspects; optimistically with cognitive effects, and contrariwise with a processing effort. As for Epistemic Vigilance, it is an aptitude intended to separate out disinformation and misleading information from the conveyed message. A common understanding of the word *slogan* encompasses a word or phrase that is easy to remember, used e.g. by a political party or in advertising to attract people’s attention or to suggest an idea quickly (Hornby 1995). It seems that relevance and Epistemic Vigilance play a crucial role in establishing the pragmatic meaning of social slogans and help to understand their nature.
2. Slogan: definition

The word *slogan* comes from *slaugh-ghairm*, which is Gaelic for ‘battle-cry’. While examining slogans’ definitions found in literature devoted to the subject (Safire 1972, Lewicki 1995, Kamińska-Szyma 1996, Budzyński 2000) three basic elements reappear. First, the formal aspect, which shows that only effective and characteristic slogans are noticed, understood and remembered. Second, the communicative aspect, which manifests itself in the fact that slogans convey a certain meaning. The third element which reappears in slogans’ definitions is the perlocutory aspect. This aspect demonstrates the intention of provoking a particular action with the use of a slogan (Kochan 2003: 19–20, Dybko 2009). One can distinguish advertising, political and social slogans according to their main purpose and their recipients.

3. Situation of communicating with the use of slogans

In order to establish the concept of a slogan one has to acknowledge the elements of the situation of communicating with the use of slogans. First, the one who speaks is the message originator. Second, the product that is the entity or an action about which the message originator is speaking. Third, the creator who is the author of the slogan and the message itself. Next, the idea that is communicated to the recipient, which is the target group. Moreover, one needs to take into consideration the message, which is the slogan itself and the intention, which is the planned effect of the act of communication. While communicating with the use of slogans a crucial role is also performed by the context. There is a distinction between the internal context which includes the text accompanying the slogan, the image, possibly also music and the external context which is the discourse within which the slogan reaches the recipient. It can include the whole reality, for instance other messages, commercials, the present situation in the country or current events etc. Clearly, the acknowledgement of the above mentioned aspects is vital for a broader understanding of the concept of a slogan (Kochan 2003: 22–45, Dybko 2007).

4. Types of advertisement slogans

While considering advertisements, three positions where slogans appear in a message can be distinguished: the headline, the actual slogan, and the *slogo*, which is also called a signature line or a baseline (Kochan 2003: 84–85, Dybko 2007).

The headline appears at the top of the text in press advertisements or at the beginning of the message in television or radio commercials. It can take
the form of a large heading, the title containing a question or a general statement with the aim to catch attention, provoke interest and promise benefit. The headline presents a witty-provoking style and it concerns a particular idea. It is related to a single message, which changes between various stages of the same advertising campaign and between campaigns.

The actual slogan appears in the middle or in the second part of the message. It is distinguished through its size, font, colour or in radio commercials through a distinct manner of speech. Its tone can be either witty or serious expressing general features of the product or service advertised. The actual slogan is a combination of words or a short sentence that encourages people to buy a product. It expresses a certain mental shortcut which aims at both accurate addressing potential customers and emphasizing the advantages of a product or a service advertised (Budzyński 2000: 108, Dybko 2007). Its function is to sum up the main message. The actual slogan is permanent in one campaign related to a particular product, but it changes between campaigns.

The slogo, or the signature line (baseline), appears right next to the logotype of the company, the brand or the product, at the end or at the bottom of the message. It is graphically distinct through the font type, colour and background. The slogo, which has a relatively small size, lacks the relation with the image. Having a rather serious style the signature line is not strongly related to a particular message. It concerns the world of messages of one message originator or different products of the same company. The baseline is the most general among the three types of slogans because it expresses the global mission or the motto of the company. The slogo can be permanent between campaigns, attributed to the company for years, or permanent for the company offering various products (Kochan 2003: 84–85, Dybko 2007).

5. Types of political slogans

As regards political slogans, one can distinguish the main slogan or the actual slogan (the programme-ideological message) or the slogo (values) and other slogans of more occasional character, supplementing and supporting the main slogan. If the main slogan resembles the slogo, the supplementing slogan or slogans add the programme-ideological message. When the main slogan is similar to the actual slogan the supporting slogans fill the needs related to the candidate’s presentation, bringing him or her closer to the voters and direct winning of support (Kochan 2003: 85–87, Dybko 2009: 2).

In politics, slogans usually change totally between campaigns. It is due to their aspiration to be politically actual and valid. They are supposed to express
the programme which is most suited to the needs and feelings of the voters at a particular moment. Therefore it is difficult to expect that the same candidate or the party will be using the same slogan two times. Such literal repetitions may have an intercultural character only: one can use the slogan of a different candidate or of a different party again soliciting for votes in another country (Kochan 2003: 85–87, Dybko 2009: 2).

6. Types of social slogans

Social advertising resembles classical advertising. The number of slogans depends on the subject. Because a specific person or institution is less frequently advertised, the slogan almost never occurs. Most often it is the case of a campaign led with the use of one slogan, which summarises the main message. When there appear more slogans, then one slogan usually reappears – it is then the actual slogan (the summary of the message). Furthermore, when such situation happens, the rest of the slogans do not change. They behave in a similar way to headlines which occur in classical advertisements. The headlines are most frequently related to changing the visual stimulus (Kochan 2003: 87).

In the case of the slogans which are used by the social groups who express their views (striking, protesting, demanding and the like) there can be both. There usually occur several or even between ten and twenty slogans, among which one is sometimes acknowledged as the main slogan – the one which best expresses the idea of manifestation or the one which is the most popular (Kochan 2003: 87).

In social advertising the message either promotes certain values, a certain lifestyle (limitation of alcohol consumption, safe driving), or it is targeted against a particular person “Balcerowicz musi odejść” [Balcerowicz has to go away]. In a way this is also a political slogan, but it is used in the context of manifestation, which is a social situation or a particular thing or an action, i.e. it points to the rightness of certain actions, which is very close to the intention.

In social propaganda manifestations are often an act of expression, directing the attention to the issue. Similarly in social advertising sometimes the aim of the campaign is not to change the behaviour of the recipients but to make particular attitudes public or to popularize an idea. In social propaganda the message originator is often absent in the message although it is possible that the institution, which provides patronage for an action puts its name on the billboard. This situation is sometimes more complex than in advertising messages.
If one regards the obligatory inscriptions “Smoking tobacco causes cancer and heart diseases” as social advertising then the Minister of Health signed below them is in a sense the message originator and his presence can have an influence on the persuasiveness of the message. It is both the case which allows for a totally different interpretation: since this law was adopted by the parliament, than the actual message originator is perhaps the parliament.

Social slogans can reach the recipients in a direct contact (passers-by, observers of a manifestation) simultaneously by eyesight and hearing. It happens more rarely in television broadcast: if one can hear slogans, they are not shown and vice versa. Some slogans are destined to chanting and others are seen on banners. In social propaganda the intention is not always to make the recipient take action, even though the expectations of such kind could be formulated straightforwardly.

7. Data presentation

(1) (a) Nie pakuj się do trumny, zrobi cytologię.
    ['Don’t pack yourself into a coffin, have cervical smear done'.]
(b) Chroń się przed rakiem szyjki macicy.
    ['Protect yourself against cervical cancer'.]

(2) (a) Podaruj swój czas.
    ['Give your time'.]
(b) Hospicjum to też życie.
    ['Hospice is also life'.]

(3) (a) Depresję można pokonać.
    ['Depression can be beaten'.]
(b) Zmień perspektywę.
    ['Change your perspective'.]

8. Relevance theory

Table 1. The comparison of Gricean Pragmatics with Relevance Theory (adapted from Noveck – Sperber 2004: 2–7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Griceans and neo-Griceans</th>
<th>Relevance Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– Expectations derive from principles and maxims. They refer to principles of behaviour that speakers are expected to obey. However, the speakers might violate these regulations.</td>
<td>– The act of communicating creates in the intended audience precise and predictable expectations of relevance, which are enough on their own to lead the hearer towards the speaker’s meaning.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Such violations may be inescapable because of clash of maxims or principles, or they may be perpetrated on purpose to signify the hearer’s implicit meaning.</td>
<td>– Speakers may fail to be relevant, but they may not, if they are communicating at all, produce utterances that convey a presumption of their own relevance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– The implicit content of the utterance is habitually deduced by the hearer in his endeavour to find an interpretation which upholds the postulation that the speaker complies with the CP.</td>
<td>– Relevance theory encompasses a detailed account of relevance and its role in both communication and cognition.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The input is relevant to an individual when it interacts with background knowledge to yield new cognitive effects e.g. answering a question, correcting a mistake etc. Inputs which yield greater cognitive effects and involve a smaller processing effort are more relevant and more worth processing (Noveck – Sperber 2004: 2–7, Dybko 2009: 3). Cognitive effects can be perceived as changes in an individual’s set of assumptions resulting from the processing of an input in a context of previously held assumptions (Noveck – Sperber 2004: 2–7, Dybko 2009: 3).

As regards the role of relevance in cognition and in communication, one can distinguish two principles: “Cognitive Principle of relevance” and “Communicative principle of relevance”. The former states that “Human cognition tends to be organised to be geared to the maximization of relevance”, whereas the latter claims that “Every act of communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance” (Sperber – Wilson 1995: 266–278).

Moreover, it is believed that “the presumption of optimal relevance conveyed by every utterance is precise enough to ground a specific comprehension heuristic”, which means that “The utterance is relevant enough to be worth processing” and that “it is the most relevant one compatible with communicator’s abilities and preferences” (Sperber – Wilson 1995: 266–278).

In relevance theory it is suggested to “Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the utterance”. This concerns particularly resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacies and going beyond
linguistic meaning, by computing implicatures. The advocates of Relevance Theory advice to “stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied”, which is understood as Relevance-guided comprehension heuristic (Sperber – Wilson 1995: 266–278).

9. Epistemic Vigilance

Epistemic Vigilance is an aptitude intended to separate out disinformation and misleading information from the conveyed message. Epistemic vigilance comprises three separate components. The first capacity concerns the penchant for the testimony of a benevolent communicator. The second component is related to the comprehension of the epistemic aspect of deception. The third one involves the grasp of its premeditated element (Mascaro – Sperber 2009).

Humans rely heavily on two dimensions to characterize other people and predict their behaviour. First, benevolence which encompasses their perceived good or ill intentions. Second, competence which encompasses their perceived ability to execute those intentions.

These two dimensions can be seen as critical in identifying good co-operators that is people who are willing to help. This refers to competent informants who are the individuals able to provide relevant information and benevolent informants who are the individuals willing to provide the relevant information. One of the key issues in this subject matter is the notion of incompetence which produces accidental information or mistakes. Another notion of great significance is malevolence which produces intentional misinformation or deception.

10. Connection between Relevance Theory and Epistemic Vigilance

The theoretical assumptions of Relevance Theory i.e. Cognitive principle of relevance and Communicative principle of relevance and the assumptions of Epistemic Vigilance can be combined. One theory does not exclude the other. However, relevance comes first and only then Epistemic Vigilance comes into play.
11. Results and discussion

Table 2. Selected social slogans’ meaning within the combined framework of Relevance Theory and Epistemic Vigilance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slogan’s text</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Type of slogan</th>
<th>Meaning (contextual implication)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (a) Niepakuj się do trumny, zrób cytologicznie. [‘Don’t pack yourself into a coffin, have cervical smear done’.]</td>
<td>Polska Unia Onkologii (Polish Union of Oncology)</td>
<td>Headline (catching the recipient’s attention, provoking interest, promising certain benefit)</td>
<td>If you have cervical smear done, you will live.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (b) Chronię się przed rakiem szyjki macicy. [‘Protect yourself against cervical cancer’.]</td>
<td>Polska Unia Onkologii (Polish Union of Oncology)</td>
<td>Actual slogan (summary of the message)</td>
<td>Polish Union of Oncology advises women to protect themselves against cervical cancer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (a) Podaruj swój czas. [‘Give your time’.]</td>
<td>Fundacja Hospicyjna (Hospice Foundation)</td>
<td>Headline (catching the recipient’s attention and provoking interest)</td>
<td>Give away your time and spend it helping in the hospice. The hospice needs volunteers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (b) Hospicjum to też życie. [‘Hospice is also life’.]</td>
<td>Fundacja Hospicyjna (Hospice Foundation)</td>
<td>Slogan (the global mission and the motto of the foundation)</td>
<td>Hospice is not only an institution for terminally ill people but also a place where one can enjoy life. Become a volunteer and help the ill to enjoy life.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (a) Depresję można pokonać. [‘Depression can be beaten’.]</td>
<td>Wyższa Szkoła Handlu i Prawa im. Ryszarda Łazarskiego (Lazarski University) Firma Eli Lilly Sp. z o.o. (Eli Lilly and Company)</td>
<td>Headline (catching the recipient’s attention, provoking interest, promising certain benefit)</td>
<td>There is some hope for the people who suffer from depression. It does not have to last forever. One can fight with it and beat it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 (b) Zmień perspektywę. [‘Change your perspective’.]</td>
<td>Wyższa Szkoła Handlu i Prawa im. Ryszarda Łazarskiego (Lazarski University) Firma Eli Lilly Sp. z o.o. (Eli Lilly and Company)</td>
<td>Actual slogan (summary of the message)</td>
<td>Change your attitude. You need to look at your illness from a different perspective and have more distance to yourself and all your problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In (1ab) the message originator is the Polish Union of Oncology. Both the headline and the actual slogan are designed to prevent women from cervical cancer and to protect their life. Since Epistemic Vigilance is the capability used to detach disingenuous and false information from the communicated idea, the conveyed message will be scrutinised by the recipients of these social slogans. The mental process will be carried out in order to detect the untruthful content. Due to the fact that Epistemic Vigilance comprises three separate mechanisms the process will be performed in three stages. The first stage will relate to the first capacity concerning the penchant for the testimony of a benevolent communicator. In (1ab) the communicator that is the Polish Union of Oncology is viewed as truly benevolent. The second stage will concern the second component encompassing comprehension of the epistemic aspect of deception. The third stage will involve the struggle for understanding of its premeditated element (Mascaro – Sperber 2009).

As mentioned earlier, individuals depend heavily on two dimensions to describe other people and predict their behaviour. First, benevolence which includes their good or ill motivation. Second, competence which includes their capability to accomplish the motivation and their goal.

The Polish Union of Oncology seems to be a competent informant which is able to provide relevant information on the significance of having ‘cervical smear done’ and the importance of protecting oneself “against cervical cancer”. Moreover, it is a benevolent informant who is willing to provide the relevant information without having any benefit for itself whatsoever. The benefit can be attained by the recipients themselves namely the women who see the social campaign and apply the methods suggested. In other words, they have a greater chance to sustain their lives.

In (2ab) the message originator is Hospice Foundation. As for the level of benevolence and competence one can admit that it is relatively high. It is because hospice in general is an institution where the terminally ill people and their families receive help and moral support. The social campaign’s cry for volunteers and their time is of great relevance considering the context of sustaining the life of the patients. Even though on the surface the benefit for the recipients of the conveyed message seems to be very small, in fact after reconsideration one might reach the conclusion that actually by helping the others one forgets about his or her problems and does some positive actions which are obviously the source of happiness and the feeling of satisfaction. The cognitive effects achieved after processing the content of the headline and the slogan are truly and inevitably great for the individuals who are not focussed so much on themselves but rather on the well being of the others.

In (3ab) the message originator is Lazarski University and Eli Lilly pharmaceutical company. As regards the competence of these two institu-
tions one could say that it is of a relatively high degree. Both employ numerous experts and carry out extensive research in the field of fighting with depression. The social campaign containing the headline “Depression can be beaten” and the actual slogan “Change your perspective” was organized together with a scientific conference devoted to the subject of depression. As for benevolence, however, one might suspect that since a pharmaceutical company was involved in organizing the conference, perhaps it wanted to gain some benefit for itself, namely to promote its medicaments for fighting with depression. This, certainly does not have to be the case, but a vigilant recipient can obviously have such suspicions.

12. Conclusions

Relevance and Epistemic Vigilance play a crucial role in establishing the pragmatic meaning of social slogans and help to understand them in a better way. Social slogans are inputs which yield numerous cognitive effects and involve very small processing effort. They are created in such a way to seem most relevant and worth processing among other inputs available. In (1–2) the speaker is both benevolent and competent. In (1ab) the focus is put on the benefit of the recipient. In (2ab) the recipient is asked to give his or her time and help, however, in the end, he or she can achieve some satisfaction from his or her volunteer work in the hospice, therefore attaining some benefit as well. In (3ab) the speakers seem to be competent, although vigilant target groups might suspect that they are not absolutely benevolent. The reason why the recipients can have such suspicions is the context of the situation. On the surface the recipients should gain some benefit, namely to find out how to fight with depression, but after a thorough analysis of the whole social campaign and the role of its message originators they might discover that it is the message originators who want to gain benefit themselves. Obviously, it is the recipient who has the chance to decide to which extent the speaker is benevolent and competent and very often even the messages conveyed by malevolent and incompetent communicators can contain some relevant information. Discovering any deception is of the greatest relevance possible. Being able to develop the skill of detecting misinformation is the issue which definitely requires further research.
NOTES

1 Kochan (2003: 244–245) defines slogans as follows: “[Slogans are]... short messages, which constitute a closed entirety, [they] either stand out from an advertising or a propaganda text, or exist by themselves, [they] are characterized by a brief, often poetic form. Slogans have a certain meaning (information or a promise and an encouragement to take an action), which is most often implicit and uses largely emotional and paralinguistic means. Slogans contain ‘perlocutory aspirations’, i.e. the intentions to provoke actions pertinent to the direction set by the message carried by them, implementing those intentions only in the primary situation context and on the grounds of accepting the postulated by it common emotional identifications and expectations”.

2 Among the techniques of editing the headline several most crucial ones can be listed such as reference to current affairs, transforming a well-known saying, reference to celebrities and evoking the recipients’ needs and wants. One can distinguish questioning, informing, provoking, ordering and narrative headlines. They can also advise or highlight the feature of the product or service advertised (Budzyński 2000: 101–105).

3 The actual slogan usually has the form of a gerund clause, an adverbial or adjectival structure, also a paraphrase or a rhyme.

4 Among the actual slogans one can list declarative, humorous, interrogative, raising interest, communicating novelty and imperative slogans. Furthermore, the types of actual slogans include prestigious, identifying the product, evoking emotions, ambiguous and contrastive ones. They can also promote quality and highlight originality or the attractive price of the product (Budzyński 2003: 109–111). In addition, Russell – Lane (2000: 515–517) propose the division into institutional and sale slogans.

5 Sometimes the English language is used, frequently personal forms and pronouns, rarely rhyme.

6 However, this does not always end with a success. If the same person or the same group somehow copies a slogan the repetition may regard the main message of the slogan. Still, the linguistic form has to be at least partly changed.

7 Which is the easiest to chant and has the biggest values of encouraging the demonstrators (Kochan 2003: 87).

8 Social advertising and protests of particular social groups, for example environmentalists or workers.

9 For example a foundation which takes care of a certain social problem.

10 These inputs include external stimuli, which can be perceived and attended to and mental representations, which can be preserved, recalled or used as premises in inference (Noveck – Sperber 2004: 2–7, Dybko 2009: 3).

11 Three types of cognitive effects can be distinguished, namely: derivation of new assumptions, modification of the degree of strength of previously held assumptions and deletion of previously held assumptions (Noveck – Sperber, 2004: 2–7, Dybko 2009: 3).

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KEEPING TRACK OF MOTION EVENTS IN TRANSLATION.  
A CASE OF A SPANISH TRANSLATION OF J.K. ROWLING’S  
HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS

Abstract

The main concern here is the cognitive analysis of motion events in translating from English (a satellite-framed language) to Spanish (a verb-framed language). Briefly presented is an overview of the theoretical background which forms the framework for the study, namely Talmy’s typology of lexicalization patterns and Slobin’s “thinking for speaking” hypothesis.

The data sample of 88 motion events (143 with satellites) has been selected from J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets and from its Spanish translation, considering the quantitative and qualitative criteria. It is here argued that typological differences between S-languages and V-languages lead to numerous problems in rendering the aspects of Path and Manner of Motion. Special attention is also given to the possible translation strategies of compensating for typological restrictions.

1. Introduction

The aim of the present contribution is to analyze the phenomenon of motion events in translating from English (a satellite-framed language) to Spanish (a verb-framed language) from the cognitive perspective. In order to investigate the scope of influence that lexicalization patterns exert on human communication about motion I chose to focus on the process of translating since a felicitous rendering requires from translators adjusting the original text to the typological and stylistic features of a target language. In the initial section of this paper I briefly present two approaches which strongly inspired my research,
namely Talmy’s typology of lexicalization patterns and Slobin’s “thinking for speaking” hypothesis. The following sections provide a thorough analysis of motion events found in the data sample selected from J.K. Rowling’s *Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets* and their Spanish translation. The case study is carried out according to the quantitative and qualitative criteria. Translation problems and rendering techniques as regards Path and Manner of Motion are illustrated with examples from the data sample.

2. Cognitive tools for analyzing motion events

Since motion is ever-present in human life the domain of motion serves as an excellent field of study. Talmy’s typology of lexicalization patterns and Slobin’s “thinking for speaking” hypothesis (as well as its extensions to the activity of writing and translating) provide theoretical background indispensable for analyzing motion events.

According to Talmy (1985, 2001: 21–146), motion events are situations which include movement or maintain a stationary location. He differentiates six semantic elements of a motion event and divides them into four internal components and two external co-event components. The internal components constitute Figure, Ground, Path and Motion. The meaning of these components is characterized as follows: the term “Figure” is understood as the object that is in movement, the term “Ground” can be defined as a reference point for the displacement of the Figure, the term “Path” indicates the trajectory followed by the Figure and the term “Motion” refers to the existence of motion per se. The external co-event components are Cause and Manner. The term “Cause” expresses the reason for the motion whereas the term “Manner” indicates the way in which motion is performed.

Talmy claims (1985, 2001: 21–146) that Path proves the core information of a motion event and suggests that languages can be divided into a two-category typology: verb-framed languages and satellite-framed languages, depending on the way in which they encode the core feature. Verb-framed languages (V-languages), such as Spanish or Japanese, conflate Motion and Path in a verb and may optionally allocate Manner in a separate expression whereas satellite-framed languages (S-languages), for instance English or German, express Motion and Manner conflated in a verb and Path in a satellite (Talmy 1985, 2001: 21–146). The term “satellite” is defined as “the grammatical category of any constituent other than a noun-phrase or prepositional phrase complement that is in a sister relation to the verb root” (Talmy 2001: 102).

Slobin’s “thinking for speaking” hypothesis is a modified version of Sapir-Whorf hypothesis concerning linguistic relativity. Slobin was not
concerned with proving the effects of language on nonlinguistic behaviour or
world view but he focused on showing how linguistic tools offered by a native
language influence thought in the moment of speaking. He claims that
“thinking for speaking” involves picking those characteristics that (a) fit some
contceptualization of the event, and (b) are readily encodable in the
language” (Slobin 2003: 1), which means that speakers of different languages
may perceive exactly the same event but the way they verbalize it seems to
vary across languages.

In order to investigate the “thinking for speaking” hypothesis Berman
and Slobin (1987) conducted research on motion events collecting oral
narratives from children and adults in five languages: English, German,
Hebrew, Spanish and Turkish. The spoken narratives were elicited by
a wordless picture storybook Frog, where are you? (Mayer 1969), which tells
a story of a boy who set out to find his runaway frog. The results of this
research allowed Berman and Slobin to define typological contrasts found
between narratives in S-framed languages and V-framed languages. English
narratives included a higher number of manner verbs than Spanish narratives,
which in turn contained more path verbs than English narratives. If, apart
from bare verbs, English verb + satellite constructions are to be taken into
consideration as well, the imbalance of the number of different motion verbs
between English and Spanish proved even deeper. English narrators also
tended to accumulate several path elements with a single motion verb and
give more Ground details per clause than Spanish speakers, who usually
mentioned only a single piece of information about the Ground in an
individual clause. In contrast, when Spanish narrators expressed a complex
path they usually chose to break the event into its simpler elements and present
each trajectory in a separate clause headed by a different path verb. Finally,
Spanish and English narrators differed in terms of the description of setting.
As English speakers availed themselves of elaborate means for expressing
trajectories there was no need for the explicit description of background.
Spanish narrators, however, since they often left paths to be inferred from the
context, offered more extensive descriptions of a physical setting.

Slobin stresses that the typological contrasts in rhetorical style found in
the “frog story” studies are not restricted only to the activity of speaking and
postulates that exactly the same patterns are widely attested in writing and
translating.

3. Data

As said above, the main concern of this paper is to investigate the influence
that lexicalization patterns exert on the process of translating. I shall seek to
provide an answer to what extent differences in the codability of motion events found in S-languages and V-languages constitute a formidable obstacle for translators. It is expected that a better understanding of lexicalization patterns may explain at least some of the problems of translatability. As competent translators always strive to accommodate the original text to the typological and stylistic features of their native languages, this analysis also delves into the variety of translation strategies, for instance omission, insertion or substitution of an element of a motion event. The data sample was taken from an English novel, namely *Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets*, and from its translation into Spanish by Adolfo Muñoz García and Nieves Martín Azofra. Inspired by Özçalýskan’s (2005) study, the procedure was to open the original and read it until collecting 88 different instances of motion events, giving the total number of 143 instances when counted with satellites. Subsequently, I examined the translation of the original and compared English motion events with their Spanish equivalents. The study focused on a comparison of the English and the Spanish data in terms of translation accuracy regarding Path and Manner descriptions.

4. Quality and quantity of path and manner verbs in translation

As was already indicated, English and Spanish differ with respect to the number and variety of motion verbs used in both languages. The results of my research confirm this claim since not only the number of Spanish verbs found in the translation turned out to be smaller than that of English motion verbs present in the original, but also the Spanish translation showed far less diversity of motion verbs types when compared with the source text. The results are given in (1) and (2):

(1) English verbs (88 types):
advance, arrive, back away, bound off, burst into, climb, collapse, come, creep, cross, dart, dash, dive, drag, drive, duck under, edge along, fall, fight one’s way, fling, float, fly, follow, gallop, get, glide, go, hurry, jerk, jog, jump, land, lead, lean, leap, leave, march, move, pass, pull, push, raid, raise, reach, return, reverse, rocket, roll, round, run, scramble, shake, shoot toward, shudder, shuffle, sink, skid, slide, slip, slouch, slump, sneak, soar, speed, spin, spring, sprint, step, stomp, stride, stroll, strut, sweep, swing, swoop, take, tear, throw, tip, trapse, tremble, trip, trundle, waddle, wade, walk, wander, wind

(2) Spanish verbs (65 types):
The data in (1) and (2) clearly show that English verbs extracted from the original outnumber their Spanish equivalents. The contrast proves even more vivid if English verb + satellite constructions are considered, since English verbs exhibit a greater variety when combined with satellites, resulting in the total of 143 types. It is crucial to observe that the English original is saturated with manner verbs as they constitute the overwhelming majority: 68 types of manner verbs out of 88 types of verbs of motion. This quantity stands in sharp contrast to the Spanish translation, which contained only 27 types of manner verbs. Moreover, the English corpus of manner verbs proved more diverse than the Spanish one since English manner verbs are usually more expressive in meaning due to their “two-tiered” lexicon (Slobin 1997: 459). Slobin claims that languages have two tiers of manner verbs: a general level consisting of frequently used verbs, like walk or run, and a more specific second level represented by manner verbs which are more exceptional and expressive, such as strut or dart. Since the second tier of English manner lexicon is very extensive cognitive linguists who have recently analyzed this semantic component have made an attempt to subdivide this very broad category of Manner into more specific semantic classes, such as: “ways of walking / jumping”, “furtive motion”, “obstructed motion”, “smooth motion”, “leisurely motion” (Slobin 2000: 119), “ways of running/ swimming/ flying”, “forced motion”, “state of Figure”, “rate of motion” (Ibarretxe-Antuñano 2006: 9–10), “no aim in motion”, “unsteady/ uncontrolled motion”, “length of steps”, “shape of legs” and “use of Figure’s hands” (Cifuentes Férez 2007: 120). I used the above-mentioned categories as a template for my analysis of manner verbs. My main aim here was to discover which manner details are usually encoded in both languages. I started my examination with assigning English and Spanish manner verbs to the three categories specifying basic
human locomotive abilities, namely walking, running and jumping. The table below presents the results of my analysis:

Table 1. English and Spanish manner verbs per motor pattern categories (Walk–Run–Jump)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>English Manner Verbs</th>
<th>Spanish Manner Verbs</th>
<th>Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUMP</td>
<td>bound, jump, leap, spring</td>
<td>SALTAR ‘JUMP’ ‘dar un salto ‘jump’, saltar ‘jump’</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALTAR ‘JUMP’</td>
<td>‘dar un salto ‘jump’, saltar ‘jump’</td>
<td>2 TYPES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results clearly show that in every category the English manner verbs outnumber the Spanish manner verbs by at least half. This difference proves even more striking in the case of the motor pattern category Walk as the Spanish manner verbs constitute around 1/4 of the English manner verbs belonging to the same class. This greater specificity of the English verbs describing ways of walking can be easily explained since it is walking, rather than running or jumping, which constitutes the default human locomotive ability. Aiming to demonstrate the granularity of the English manner verbs I relied on a fine-grained classification (Slobin 2000: 119, Ibarretxe-Antuñano 2006: 9–10, Cifuentes Férez 2007: 120) and analyzed English data from Table 1 according to the following manner parameters: Forced motion: scramble, wade; Furtive motion: creep, glide, slip, sneak; Obstructed motion: trip; Smooth motion: glide, slide, slip, Leisurably motion: stroll. No aim in motion: traipse, wander; Unsteady / uncontrolled motion: slip, slump, Rate (fast): burst, dash, dart, gallop, hurry, scramble, shoot toward, spring, sprint, stride, tear; Rate (slow): jog, shuffle, State of Figure: stomp, stroll, strut, Length of steps: edge (short steps), stride (long steps), waddle (short steps), Shape of legs / feet: shuffle, stomp, Use of Figure’s hands: scramble.

If the quantity of manner verbs was the only factor considered, one might argue that the Spanish translation was successful in rendering a substantial part of the English manner verbs as out of 68 English types of such verbs 27 types were translated into Spanish manner verbs. Yet a closer examination of
the Spanish rendering shows that many of the manner verbs do not necessarily correspond to the original ones. For instance, *step out of* was translated as *escapar* ‘escape’ and although this Spanish verb is classified as a manner verb the meaning is significantly different. It is crucial to note at this point that Ibarretxe-Antuñano (2003: 163) distinguishes four scenarios of rendering Manner information into a target language (in brackets are included the symbols which represent the scenarios):

- the translation of only a portion of Manner information (\(\div\))
- the translation of a different type of Manner of motion (\(\neq\))
- the translation of the same type of Manner of motion (\(=\))
- the omission of any type of Manner of motion (\(\emptyset\))

Following this approach, I analyzed all English manner verbs found in the original data sample and their Spanish translations. It turned out that 20 Spanish manner verbs rendered exactly the same Manner information when juxtaposed with the English originals; for instance *slide through* was translated into Sp(nish) *deslizarse* ‘slide’ or *wade toward* into *vadear* ‘wade’. Moreover, there were 6 instances of conveying the same type of Manner as in the original by means of the verb + gerund construction, as in the case of the translation of the English *fly across* into the Spanish *atravesar volando* ‘cross flying’ or *run back to* into *volver corriendo* ‘return running’. However, the study also showed that as many as 47 cases of Spanish translation were devoid of any type of Manner information. Furthermore, 32 out of these 47 instances constituted the Spanish bare path verbs. This is exemplified by the translation of *climb* into Sp. *subir* ‘go up’ or *stride forward* into *avanzar* ‘advance’. The remaining 15 cases where the Manner information was omitted included 4 instances of rendering the manner verbs by means of neutral verbs (as in the Spanish translation of *march across* into *ir* ‘go’), 6 instances of translating the manner verbs into non-motion verbs (for example the Spanish rendering of *jerk toward* into *señalar* ‘signalize / indicate’), 3 cases of replacing the manner verbs for descriptions devoid of any kind of Manner information (for instance, *skid to a halt* which was translated as Sp. *tener que detenerse* ‘have to stop’) and, finally, 2 instances of rendering the manner verb into the phrase (i.e. *strut around* into Sp. *darse aires* ‘put on airs’) and into a verb + gerund construction: *slide out of* translated as Sp. *terminar de pasar* ‘finish crossing’. There were also 7 examples of rendering a different type of Manner as compared to the original manner verbs, e.g. *jump out of* was translated as Sp. *esquiar* ‘ski’ or *step out of* into *escapar* ‘escape’. As regards the instances of the partial rendering of the Manner information, in 12 cases the Spanish translators managed to convey at least a portion of the Manner information by means of the Spanish manner verbs, e.g. *gallop alongside* was rendered into Sp. *correr* ‘run’. Furthermore, there were 6 instances of conveying part of the Manner information by means of the verb + gerund construction (as in the
case of the Spanish translation of *hurry through* into Sp. *ir corriendo* ‘go running’) and 3 cases of using the verb + adverb construction for a partial rendering of the Manner information, e.g. *slip out of* was translated into Sp. *salir sigilosamente* ‘go out silently’. Finally, there were 4 instances of partial conveying the Manner information by means of descriptions; (e.g. the Spanish rendering of *tremble as sentir un temblor* ‘feel trembling’), 1 case of employing a verb + phrase construction (cf. the Spanish translation of *dash across* into *cruzar a toda pastilla* ‘cross at top speed’) and 1 instance of using a non-motion verb (cf. the rendering of *slide back into* into Sp. *mezclar* ‘blend with’). Table 2 summarizes the analysis of the data.

Table 2. The summary of qualitative analysis of the Spanish translation of the English manner verbs: the data sample of 107 English manner verbs: 68 types + satellites (Symbols (=) the same type of Manner information, (≠) a different type of Manner information, (Ø) no Manner information, (÷) only a portion of Manner information)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>≠</th>
<th>Ø</th>
<th>÷</th>
<th>Total number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manner Verb</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39/107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Path Verb</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>32/107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral Verb</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4/107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-motion Verb</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7/107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verb + Adverb</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3/107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verb + Gerund</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13/107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verb + Phrase</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1/107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phrase</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1/107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7/107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>26/107</td>
<td>7/107</td>
<td>47/107</td>
<td>27/107</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As regards the Spanish rendering of the English path verbs, the accuracy was much higher as in most cases the Spanish translation matches the source text, except for rare instances when the Spanish translators used more schematic verbs than those present in the original, for example *cross* was translated into Sp. *ir* ‘go’ and *move* into *hacer algún movimiento* ‘make a movement’.
5. Path of motion in translation: problems and translation techniques

Three main problems can be distinguished (see Slobin 1996: 204, 209–212) as regards the rendering of the Path information from English into Spanish, namely the abundance of grounds present in English and their scarcity in Spanish, the impossibility of conveying several trajectories with a single motion verb in Spanish and the Spanish preference for a static description over a dynamic narration.

The different distribution of locative details in English and Spanish poses a serious obstacle for translators. Since it proves problematic for Spanish to convey several Path elements with only one motion verb, Spanish translators often opt for the reduction of ground elements, as is illustrated in (4):

(4) They hurried through the garden and back into the house. (J.K. Rowling 1999: 33) Y fueron corriendo a su encuentro. ['And they went running to meet him.'](J.K. Rowling 2010: 39)

The context for the example in (4) is that Harry Potter together with his friends are in the garden when Mr. Weasley comes back home. The boys want to meet with him so they run back into the house. The trajectory described in the original is very precise as the sentence contains three grounds (in bold) attached to the same verb, namely hurried through the garden, hurried back and hurried into the house, whereas the Spanish rendering omitted all the locative details except for the Goal element expressed by the preposition a ‘to’. Since the context specifies the previous location of the boys, the Spanish translators decided to delete all three ground elements, as it can be readily presupposed that, if the children are somewhere in the garden and they want to enter the house, they simply have to go back to this house through the garden. In principle, Spanish translators could have preserved the Path components from the original sentence and could have used an extra verb (or verbs) to render the missing trajectory. However, such a strategy would inevitably result in an odd style for Spanish-speaking readers, who are used to moving along from one verb to another without “cluttering” a text with a series of grounds. The phenomenon of numerous grounds attached to a single motion verb in English manifests itself also in a different translation solution, namely breaking up a complex trajectory. Spanish translators often opt for adding a separate path verb for each of the trajectory segments expressed by English satellites. Let us consider the example in (5):

(5) And they marched off through the crowd of curious Muggles, out of the station and back into the side road... (J.K. Rowling 1999: 56)

Y abriéndose paso a través de la multitud de Muggles curiosos, salieron de la estación y regresaron a la calle lateral...
And making their way through the crowd of curious Muggles, (they) went out of the station and returned to the side road ...” (J.K. Rowling 2010: 65)

Since the Path could not be deduced from the preceding context, the complex trajectory was broken up and the Path information expressed by the English satellites was conveyed by means of extra path verbs. This explains the appearance of two additional verbs in the Spanish translation: salir ‘go out’ and regresar ‘return’.

Yet another problem in rendering of the Path information is created by the Spanish tendency for a static depiction over a dynamic narration, the latter being characteristic of the English original. Due to this tendency the Spanish translators often describe a trajectory or a background instead of the movement of a protagonist, as illustrated in (6):

(6) ...and [they] began dragging them up the grassy slope, toward the great oak front doors. (J.K. Rowling 1999: 60)

...y los arrastraron por la ladera cubierta de césped, hacia arriba, donde les esperaban las inmensas puertas de roble de la entrada principal.

[‘...and [they] dragged them through the slope covered with grass, upwards, where the immense oak front door waited for them.’] (J.K. Rowling 2010: 71)

Clearly, in the English source text it is the movement of the characters which is described by [they] began dragging them...toward the great oak front doors. By contrast, the Spanish translators, instead of depicting the motion of the protagonists, decided to describe the setting by means of the relative clause donde les esperaban las inmensas puertas de roble de la entrada principal ‘where the immense oak front door waited for them’.

6. Manner of motion in translation: problems and translation techniques

Spanish translators have to face up to problems resulting from radically different degrees of Manner salience in English and Spanish. They have to decide to what extent the Manner information should be rendered to prevent a translation from sounding odd to a Spanish-speaking reader. In order to avoid foregrounding of the Manner of motion, V-languages resort to neutral verbs in order to express a default Manner of movement, for instance dogs or birds just “go” or “come” (Slobin 1997: 456). Spanish translators render the Manner by means of the main verb slot only under the condition that it conveys an atypical way of an individual’s movement and, moreover, there is no boundary-crossing. Slobin (1997: 441) claims that “it appears to be a universal characteristic of V-languages that crossing a spatial boundary is conceived of as a change of state, and that state changes require
an independent predicate in such languages”. Let us consider the example in (7):

(7) ... a huge barn owl **swooped** through the dining room window... (J.K. Rowling 1999: 20)

... una lechuza **penetró** por la ventana del comedor... [‘... a barn owl **entered** through the dining room window...’] (J.K. Rowling 2010: 25)

The manner verb *swoop*, which expresses the unusual fashion of the owl’s appearance in (7), belongs to the second tier of manner verbs, yet the Spanish translators used the verb *penetrar* ‘enter’, which belongs to the first tier. Since *swooping through the window* designates crossing a boundary it explains why the translators could not use any manner verb to convey the Manner information but it does not explain why they did not choose to express a dynamic Manner of motion by means of an additional lexical tool, such as a gerund, an adverb or a prepositional phrase, which is often the case. Let us consider the set of examples below:

(8) He let go of the gnome’s ankles: it **flew** twenty feet into the air... (J.K. Rowling 1999: 33)

Entonces (él) soltó al gnomo y éste **salió volando** por el aire... [‘Then (he) let go of the gnome and it **went out flying** in the air...’] (J.K. Rowling 2010: 39)

(9) They **slipped** out of the kitchen... (J.K. Rowling 1999: 35)

**Salieron sigilosamente** de la cocina... [‘They **went out** of the kitchen **silently**...’] (J.K. Rowling 2010: 41)

(10) Mr. Weasley **dashed** across the road... (J.K. Rowling 1999: 54)

El señor Weasley **crució** la calle **a toda pastilla**... [‘Mr. Weasley **crossed** the street **at top speed**...’] (J.K. Rowling 2010: 63)

Unlike in (7), in (8–10) the Spanish translators decided to express the Manner of motion. In example (8), the English manner verb *fly* was rendered as *salir volando* ‘go out flying’, hence the Manner information was explicitly conveyed by the gerund *volando* ‘flying’. The fragment in (9) represents the strategy of expressing the Manner by means of an adverb, the English manner verb *slip* was translated into *salir sigilosamente* ‘go out silently’. Although the adverb *sigilosamente* ‘silently’ does not constitute a perfect rendering of the Manner information in the original, it partially conveys the Manner of motion expressed in the English verb *slip*. The example (10) shows yet another option of rendering the Manner information, namely a prepositional phrase. In (10), the prepositional phrase *a toda pastilla* ‘at top speed’ is used to convey the parameter of fast rate present in the English verb *dash*. Even though Spanish translators are equipped with three different types of
alternative lexical tools for rendering the Manner information, they do not always decide to take advantage of these means, as was illustrated under (7). It happens quite often that Spanish translators replace manner verbs only with bare path verbs, which sometimes leads to straightforward discrepancies between the original and the Spanish rendering, as in (11):

(11) ...Ron and Hermione fought their way over... (J.K. Rowling 1999: 50) ...
    Ron and Hermione se acercaban... ['...Ron and Hermione approached...']
    (J.K. Rowling 2010: 59)

In the original, the characters fought their way over, which informs about the effort the protagonists had to make in order to proceed, whereas there is no mention about this aspect of motion in the translation. Instead of conveying the Manner information, the rendering highlights the Path of motion and brings the fact of approaching to the reader’s attention.

7. Conclusions

The present paper shows that typological differences between S-languages and V-languages lead to certain problems in rendering motion events, in particular the aspects of Path and Manner of Motion. Special attention was given to the numerous problems in rendering the Path and Manner components as well as to the possible translation strategies of compensating for typological restrictions. As earlier studies have shown (Slobin 1996, 1997, 2000), S-languages lose more in translation into V-languages than in the opposite direction. In my study, therefore, I focused on such contrasts. In line with the expectations, my study of the Spanish translation of the English novel showed that there were many differences between the English data sample of motion verbs and their Spanish translation. First, the English lexicon of motion verbs considerably outnumbers the Spanish one and exhibits a greater diversity of motion verb types. Moreover, it was shown that the English manner verbs due to their elaborated second tier exhibit rich granularity, and thus they can be further classified into many fine-grained categories. The analysis also provided an insight into the application of various rendering techniques. It also confirms the claim that the distinctions in codability of motion events found in English and Spanish constitute a serious obstacle for translators. To conclude, capturing typological discrepancies in motion events between S-languages and V-languages should be helpful to translators. Comprehending the distinction in lexicalization patterns may increase translators’ awareness as regards their choices in employing different translation strategies. However, a more extensive study needs to be undertaken in order to uncover the semantic and syntactic nature of motion verbs
belonging to the two typological groups. As for English and Spanish Cifuentes-Férez (2008) attempted such an analysis in her PhD dissertation.

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Özçalýskan, Şeyda

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publication Details</th>
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</thead>
</table>
Abstract

The paper analyses figurative applications of phrases containing words connected with human seeing (e.g. the verbs see, look, espy, nouns like sight, look, eye and adjectives such as blynd). It shows the motivation for metaphoric expressions used by Chaucer to express his thoughts and visions in a most vivid and precise way and their further development in the language system. The analysis is based on the data obtained from Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales (Ellesmere MS), the Oxford English Dictionary online and the Middle English Dictionary. As regards its theoretical basis it refers to Lakoff–Johnson’s theory of cognitive metaphor.

1. Aim of the paper

This paper will confront the tenets of the cognitive approach to metaphor and the data obtained from Geoffrey Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales. The study contains an analysis of only those metaphoric expressions which refer to the domain of seeing since visual experience is undoubtedly common to both contemporary and medieval man.

2. Metaphor in cognitive linguistics

There is no denying that sight makes the highest rank of human senses. It provides all sorts of indispensable information, like that regarding possible dangers, distance evaluation and physical characteristics of the surroundings. Thus sight and the images it provides become basic tools which help to
describe the world, its beauty and ugliness, shape our reasoning, though not necessarily reaching for literal meaning.

The world depicted as it is, with no use of figurative language, would seem dull and boring like a shopping list or a laundry receipt. Metaphor gives us a shortcut directly into our minds, connects things seemingly unconnectable and enables, otherwise not equally precise, transfer, activating all conscious and subconscious associations in the brain.

In fact, the concept of metaphor itself constitutes nothing else but the way of seeing the world, the manifestation of how life and its aspects are conceived of (Turner 1987). Not being a rhetoric device, the approach rejected already in 1893 by Biese (in Kiełtyka 2008: 94), whose view was then advocated by Lakoff – Johnson (1980), it does not merely reflect the structure of our thinking, but also influences and shapes the human reasoning of the world. Thus, if the metaphor is a way of seeing reality, it is unsurprising that sight has established an Ideal Cognitive Model of its own, which presupposes the following for the domain of seeing: “1. You see things as they are; 2. You are aware of what you see; 3. You see what’s in front of your eyes.” (Lakoff 1987: 128)

The Perception ICM provides a matrix for the metaphor operation and thus enables thinking about the world in terms of perception metaphorically and metonymically (Radden – Kövecses 1999: 38).

3. Visual perception in Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales

The theory of conceptual metaphor, though relatively young itself, should by no means be applied only to analyse the contemporary language. The same mechanisms operated effectively in the past, shaped human thinking and the perception of the surrounding world.

(1) Thus may ye seen that the gilt disserueth thralldom. (Knight’s Tale, 756)
And this wise man / saugh that hym wanted audience. (Tale of Melibee, 2236)
An whan this goode man / saugh þat it was so. (General Prologue, 850)
This Marchant saugh / ther was no remedie. (Shipman’s Tale, 1617)
(... ) ffor wel she saugh / that it was for the beste. (Franklin’s Tale, 846)
And for he saugh / that vnder heigh degree Was vertu hid. (Clerk’s Tale, 423)
And whan I saugh / he wolde neuere fine To reden on this cursed book al nyght. (The Prolouge of the Wife of Bath, 788)

As shown in (1), Chaucer repeatedly employed the UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING metaphor. The metaphor seems experientially based since sight is the basic and most reliable source of knowledge. We tend to believe what we see as we trust our sight to verify information and spot potential deception.
The metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING is apparently not a metaphor in Aristotelian understanding. The actions of seeing and understanding do not show even vague similarity. Seeing is a purely physical process involving light, lenses and reflections. Understanding, on the other hand, is a complex procedure being part of human cognition. It encompasses acquiring data and comprehending its signification. Both activities are supposed to extend our knowledge, yet sight narrows the selection of available means of collecting data material down to simply visual input. The further steps appear to be the same: processing the information in the brain. Both verbs, however, accentuate different stages of the process: seeing highlights the data acquisition, whilst understanding their analyses. Therefore, the structure of perception is reflected in the structure of apprehending. We can see the problem, look into the situation or view arguments. Nonetheless, the aforementioned metaphor cannot be treated as a mere projection of major properties of seeing onto the domain of understanding. It is grasped naturally, with no awareness of its non-literal nature, which is symptomatic of well entrenched metaphors. The whole relation might be explained by one of the basic metaphors, i.e. a thing is what it has salient properties of (Turner 1987: 16–21).

The linguistic realisation of understanding is seeing, namely see + that clause structure survived in a semantically unchanged form. Its widespread use attests the entrenchment of the metaphor in the language, although it is worthy of note that the very same structure can be also the implementation of KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor.

An eye is not only an organ of primary rank while applying the sense of seeing. It is also one of the most prominent parts of the human body, the one which catches our attention at the very first contact. It is so not solely for the reason that the eyes are positioned at the front of the head, but also because we believe they give us the insight into one’s feelings. As human beings we are perfectly aware man is an extremely deceitful creature, no wonder we want to detect any warning sign of a lie or deceit in the bud.

The next set of examples come from The Knight’s Tale:

(2) (a) He was war / as he caste his eye aside. (896)

He cast his eye / vpon Emelya. (1077)

Hir eyen caste she / ful lowe adoun. (2080)

And she agayn / hym caste a freendlich eye. (2679)

But on his lady yet caste he his eye. (2806)

(b) And as a leon / he his lookyng caste. (2168)

(...) y-turned thee the dys That hast the sighte of hire. (1237)
Examples provided under (2) instantiate Chaucer’s application of a very typical metaphor connected with the domain of seeing. However, there is a basic difference between cast an eye and cast / have a glance, look or sight. The latter involve abstract nouns for concepts not having their matter, and thus, incapable of being cast, as the activity of throwing involves having an item in your hand, taking a swipe and pushing it in the air in a previously planned direction. As sight, glance or look have no physical form which could be thrown, what can be observed in such phrases is a process of ontological metaphorisation (Kövecses 2002: 34–35). It assigns abstract concepts with a physical being and thus, in this particular case, enables the procedure of being cast.

As it comes to caste one’s / an eye the process is only seemingly different. Undeniably, an eye has its form and weight and contrary to abstract concepts, it can be visualized, touched or measured. Yet the scene of literal thrusting an eye would be genuinely blood-curding, worthy The Saw 6 3D version, not the masterpiece of poetry. Therefore, what we encounter here is the metonymy AN EYE FOR SIGHT (an object for the function of the object), which demonstrates that in both groups Chaucer used the same metaphor vehicle, yet supplemented in (2a) with the metonymisation of eye.

What seems noteworthy, the metonymy AN EYE FOR SIGHT is frequently employed by Chaucer. Such phrases are instances of metonymy and metaphor operating jointly, which gave Chaucer a powerful tool to describe the scene vividly, yet with a great economy of words. To be able to express much without overusing words appears an important criterion in language at all times.

Let us review another fragment from The Knight’s Tale:

(3) That feeld hath eyen / and the wode hath eres. (1522)

First of all, to be able to own an organ of sensory perception one must be a living creature whose organism allows the use of senses. Any number of eyes located on the surface of the field or ears attached to the trunk of a tree will turn out to be absolutely of no avail unless the metonymy PART FOR WHOLE, i.e. part of a body for a person, can be deciphered. Eyes and ears are organs responsible for gathering data from the surrounding world. Neither the wood nor the field would be able to process the data, and thus there must be people hiding among the trees or in the grain, in this case Palamon hidden in the bushes spying on unaware, yet distrustful Arcite.

(4) Veld haued hege [eye], and wude haued heare – Campus habet lumen et habet nemus auris acumen. (1225 in Englische Studien (1902) XXXI. 8)

The phrase was first recorded at the beginning of the 13th century as a rural proverb (4). With the development of cities it was shifted into a more
urban context, replacing both field and woods with walls. Both expressions continue nowadays, though each enjoys a different frequency. For some reason being stealthily watched appears to have ceased to be considered a problem, which resulted in quite a low incidence of applications (only 1 instance obtained from the Corpus of Historical American English (5); no other analysed corpora contained the phrase).

(5) The very **walls have eyes** and hands as well as ears. (Jones, J. B. *Freaks and Fortune* or, *The History of Adventures of Ned Lorn*, 1854)

As regards *walls have ears* the phrase appears to have widened its meaning. With the experience of totalitarian regimes and the nightmare of World War II, people are especially eager to protect the personal sphere of their lives. Nonetheless while pondering if the walls have ears / eyes we do not mean a person who is physically doing the eavesdropping or the watching. And even if we do, they would not have to be in the close vicinity. In the time of technological revolution a range of bugging devices can be used against an unsuspecting subject of the surveillance.

Sight is a powerful sense. Not only does it help us to protect ourselves from the enemies or even plan the attack against them, but also happens to be a weapon itself. The love of Arcite for Emily gives her the power over the enchanted man, the power that may decide about his life or death. The **SEEING IS KILLING** metaphor (6) definitely cannot be referred to as an uncommon one. We wonder what could happen if eyes could kill, why somebody looks daggers at us or is dressed to kill. No wonder, Emily, although not a basilisk, is conceptualised as owning murderous weapons enchanted in her sight.

(6) Ye **sleen me / with youre eyen** Emelye (*Knight’s Tale*, 1567)

Eyes are treated in (6) as weapons, of equal effectiveness to a sword or a knife. The **SEEING IS KILLING** metaphor shows how important what we see is and how deeply it can influence our feelings. As not only does eyesight provide information to be processed, but also it affects our emotions like love, dislike, jealousy.

Although, as already mentioned, **SEEING IS KILLING** is a relatively common metaphor, its realisation quoted in (6) seems a one-shot poetic phrase since neither historic nor contemporary usages are comprised in the analysed corpora, the Internet included.

A similar application of the metaphor might be seen in (7).

(7) (...) for **Enuye / blyndeth the herte** of man (*Parson’s Tale*, 677)

As the heart is typically associated with emotions, especially a romantic affection, the organ proves not to have been chosen randomly. It represents
the PART FOR WHOLE metonymy (where the heart represents its owner) and thus highlights the emotional nature of a human being. Besides, metonymy provides the bases for metaphor operation. Thus herte, a person in love, is treated in the sentence as a patient who is prone to being blind to reality (strong emotion is Blinding) and thus unable to think clearly, evaluate the situation logically or draw rational conclusions, as sight is connected with thinking uninfluenced by emotions (thinking unemotionally is seeing clearly). Not only emotions represented by herte but also envy are the subject of ontological metaphor. The feeling of envy is treated as a poisonous substance which may affect our perception of reality with the power commensurate with the intensity of poisonous jealousy. The heart that cannot see is also unable to discern the truth from deception, reality from a venerate, love from hatred. It develops a disease as apparently not only love is a disease, but also envy is a sickness as well.

Last but not least, Chaucer applies also synaesthetic devices.

(8) Looke eek / what seint Peter seith Actuum. (Parson’s Tale, 598)
Whan þat he saugh / þat al the peple lough. (Pardoner’s Tale, 961)

In (8), vision is described in terms of auditory stimuli. What Chaucer depicts is definitely not the harmony of sights, but the explosion of sounds: the outburst of laughter or wise words of a holy man. The verbs laugh and say evoke the domain of hearing, yet in this case to be perceived through the organs of seeing. The intersense transfer seems to have its solid grounding in the biological determinants. Sight and hearing undeniably constitute the most basic senses, which contribute to our knowledge of the world. They are the most accessible and trustworthy sources of information. What is more, the data acquired from each of them can be immediately verified by means of the other. Therefore, not surprisingly the synaesthesia indicating hearing < vision (sounds put in terms of vision) is not an uncommon phenomenon in language.

Other kinds of synaesthetic metaphors, though undoubtedly less frequent, are also quite well grounded in the linguistic system. Item (9) below represents a sight < taste relation.

(9) (...) right as the Basilicok sleeth folk by the venym of his sighte. (Parson’s Tale, 854)

As defined by the OED, venom is a “poisonous fluid” secreted by snakes or spiders in order to kill a prey or at least disarm an enemy. Therefore, the poison usually injected through the predator’s fangs (situated in the oral cavity, which is characteristic of the sense of taste) here is contained in the murderous sight.
4. Conclusions

The approach to metaphor has come through revolutionary changes. For a long time it was recognised as elaborate or intricate and, hence, available, both with regard to producing and understanding, only to the most sophisticated brains of humanity. All an average man could do was to admire and make every possible effort to comprehend the elevated with his/her down-to-earth brain. The function of this stylistic device became thus limited to a mere embellishment, something we can perfectly live without. Our language was believed not to be severely impaired with the loss of metaphor imagery, since everything, all shades of meaning, may as well be expressed by the literal usage of words (Kövecses 2002: vii-viii). However, metaphor has proved to be an inherent part of our daily thinking and reasoning about the world. Not only does it facilitate expressing our thoughts, but also enables one to understand the life as it is, providing abstract concepts with a structure, matter and/or experiential basis.

Although such understanding of metaphor is relatively novel, it proves to have been ever present in human speech and thinking. Being the record of Mediaeval English, delineating different registers of language to represent the tongues of various social strata, The Canterbury Tales provides a large number of such instances. Though some are unquestionably of more poetic nature, all of them might be explained as motivated by cognitive metaphor and thus showing conceptual associations between the source and the target. What is more, the vast majority of expressions survived in Modern English in a practically unchanged form.

Therefore, it might be concluded that it was not metaphor that changed over the centuries, but rather the way of conceiving it. The processes involved are still the same, yet our knowledge on metaphor’s conceptual nature makes us aware of it being independent of the artistic ambitions of a speaker.

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IDIOM COMPREHENSION: TWO APPROACHES

Abstract

Basing on the two most influential theories in the literature on idiom comprehension (Glucksberg 2001; Vega Moreno 2003, 2004, 2005) as well as on the account of familiar metaphor comprehension (Wilson – Carston 2006), the present author proposes an account of comprehension of familiar idioms as metaphorical expressions. Unfamiliar metaphors are comprehended on-line in a relevance-guided comprehension procedure which involves adjustment of concepts encoded in idiom constituents. When the metaphorical denotation of the idiom is memorised, the well-known idiomatic string is comprehended just as familiar metaphors in the sense of Wilson – Carston (2006), i.e. in the process of disambiguation of two encoded senses.

0. Introduction

In the recent study of comprehension of idiomatic expressions two accounts have become most influential: the approach developed by Glucksberg (2001, 2004) and the one defended by Relevance Theorists (Wilson – Carston 2006; Sperber – Wilson 2005, Vega Moreno 2003, 2004, 2005). The aim of this paper will be to compare and contrast these two approaches to idiom comprehension. In performing my study I will conduct an analysis of theories of metaphor and idiom comprehension present in both accounts. My concern will also be to analyse differences and relationship between the approaches proposed by Glucksberg (2001, 2004) and by relevance theory. Finally, I shall propose an account of idiom comprehension, which combines the main tenets of both theories. It will be argued that in the light of Glucksberg’s (2001) theory of idiom comprehension, the account proposed by Vega Moreno (2003, 2005) presents only the initial stage of idiom’s meaning.
construction. After the idiomatic meaning is learned by a language user, the idiom is comprehended as a familiar metaphor in the sense of Wilson – Carston (2006). Idiom variants, on the other hand, may be regarded as novel metaphors and understood according to Vega Moreno’s theory.

1. Metaphor comprehension by Glucksberg

In the traditional approach to metaphor, figurative expressions of the form X is Y have been viewed as implicit comparisons. Such expressions would be comprehended by being turned into the simile X is like Y, in which the properties of X and Y would be then compared. However, findings on comprehension of metaphor reported by Glucksberg (2001, 2004) show that metaphors such as this included in the sentence *My lawyer is a shark* are comprehended faster than the comparable simile *My lawyer is like a shark*. On the ground of these findings, Glucksberg (2001, 2004) opposes the view that metaphors are simply covered similes, as they prove that metaphors are comprehended in a different way than just by comparing the salient features of the vehicle and the topic.

According to Glucksberg (2001, 2004), metaphors are not comparisons but class-inclusion statements. They evoke their meaning via dual reference, which means that the metaphor vehicle *shark* is used to refer not to the literal shark but to all predatory creatures in general.

Similarly in the statement *My job is a jail* the salient features of the vehicle *jail* are attributed to the topic *job*. This particular job is now included in the more general category JAIL, and as a consequence of that categorization becomes similar in relevant respects to literal jails (Glucksberg – McGlone – Manfredi 1997).

Glucksberg names yet another class of metaphors – predicative metaphors. In these, according to Glucksberg, verbs are used figuratively. For example the verb *to fly* embodies a swift action. According to the class-inclusion theory metaphor interpretation involves selecting a salient feature of the vehicle that might attribute a value to the topic (Vega Moreno 2004). This process results in ad-hoc construction of an attributive category, which the metaphor vehicle is taken to exemplify (Vega Moreno 2004). Metaphors are class-inclusion assertions, because they assert that the topic belongs to the new category. For example, in the comprehension of the sentence *My wife’s surgeon is a butcher*, the hearer aligns the properties of the vehicle with the properties of the topic and constructs the attributive category “people who grossly botch their job”.

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2. Idiom comprehension by Glucksberg

Glucksberg (2001) proposes typology of idioms based on the degree of compositionality and semantic transparency. Idioms in the case of which there is no relation between the figurative meaning and the meanings of its constituents are non-compositional idioms. The examples of these are idioms such as *cheesecake*, meaning ‘pinup art’ and *lemon*, meaning ‘product hopelessly flawed, impossible to repair’ (Glucksberg 2001: 73).

Glucksberg opts for the compositional approach to idiom structure in which the literal meanings of idiom’s constituents map onto the components of idiomatic meaning. Compositional idioms, according to Glucksberg, may be opaque or transparent. Transparency indicates to what extent meaning of an idiom may be inferred from the meanings of its constituents.

In the case of fully transparent idioms, such as *spill the beans* and *smell a rat*, we can see one to one relation between the idiom’s constituents and the components of the metaphorical meaning. In this example the word *spill* corresponds directly to the act of revealing and the word *beans* maps directly onto *secrets*.

In opaque idioms, such as *kick the bucket*, the relation between the idiom’s constituents and its idiomatic meaning may not be evident, but still, the meanings of individual constituents constrain the way in which language users interpret and use the idiom. Idiomatic expressions such as *kick the bucket* behave as predicative metaphors. The word *kick*, meaning ‘to strike something with one’s leg’ in the idiom *kick the bucket* stands for an abrupt and swift action which maps on the manner of death and contributes to the metaphorical meaning of the idiom ‘to die suddenly’. What is more, the act of kicking is a discrete action and that is why the meaning of the word *kick* constrains the use of the idiom.

While it is acceptable to say *He laid dying all week*, the sentence *He laid kicking the bucket all week* is unacceptable. A similar mapping may be observed in the idiom *fly off the handle*.

In Glucksberg’s (2001) classification there is yet another class of idiomatic expressions, called quasi-metaphorical idioms, such as *skating on thin ice*, which act as nominal metaphors. They refer simultaneously to a hypothetical situation, which is an ideal exemplar of a situation of certain sort, and to a real situation described in terms of the hypothetical, ideal one. The features of the ideal exemplary situation map directly onto the situation in reality.

The theory of idiom comprehension developed by Glucksberg (2001) accounts for the understanding of semantically transparent idioms, such as *spill the beans* and *smell a rat*. In this theory Glucksberg (2001) proposes that the idiom *spill the beans*, when heard for the first time, is opaque to the
hearer, which means that the hearer is not able to infer the figurative meaning of the idiom from the meanings of its constituents. However, as a result of frequent use in metaphorical context, the idiom’s components become polysemous as they acquire their idiomatic meanings as secondary, literal senses. Thus the components of the idioms *spill the beans* and *smell a rat* have at least two interpretations: the literal meaning which is context free and the idiomatic meaning which is activated in idiomatic contexts.

Quasi–metaphorical idioms, such as *skating on thin ice*, behave as metaphors. They literally refer to situation, action or event that epitomises a class of situations, actions or events. *Skating on thin ice* epitomises a prototypical risky action, and may be used to any activity that is risky.

The drawback of Glucksberg’s theory of idiom comprehension is the fact that it does not give any explanation on how the idiom constituents and the idioms as a whole would acquire their meaning. Relevance Theory comes at rescue here.

3. Metaphor comprehension in Relevance Theory

According to Relevance Theory, metaphor emerges as a loose use of language. Its comprehension involves broadening and narrowing of the concepts. To illustrate the relevance-theoretic comprehension strategy of metaphor let’s consider the example below:

(1) A: Tell me more about your daughter.
   B: Well, she’s an angel.

According to Relevance Theorists, to grasp the intended figurative meaning of the word *angel*, the hearer will decode the concept ANGEL with the denotation ‘heavenly creature’. This concept contains such properties of literal angels as being endowed with supernatural powers, dwelling in heaven, having wings, being good and gentle. Following the path of least effort, the hearer uses the concept ANGEL to construct a narrower concept ANGEL* which excludes the features of being a supernatural, heavenly creature and having wings, but evokes the properties of being good and gentle.

Relevance Theory claims that broadening and narrowing of the concepts is not unique to comprehension of metaphor. Concept adjustment takes place also during the processing of the literal language, as in the following examples (Wilson – Carston 2007):

(2) For recycling we need empty bottles. (EMPTY* = close to empty)
    All politicians drink (DRINK* = drink alcohol)
    Familiar vs. novel metaphors
Studies on metaphor comprehension (e.g. Blasko – Connine 1993; Gentner – Wolff 1997; Giora 1997, 2002; Bowdle – Gentner 2005) have proved that unfamiliar and novel metaphors take significantly longer to process than either literal sentences or familiar metaphors. This suggests that familiar and novel metaphors must involve a special comprehension procedure.

Both, relevance-theoretic approach and Glucksberg’s approach, make distinction between familiar and novel metaphors. Glucksberg (2004) as well as Relevance Theorists claim that metaphors that are novel at first, become a second encoded sense overtime. Glucksberg, however, fails to offer any account of how this might happen.

Sperber – Wilson (2006) and Wilson – Carston (2007) claim that metaphorical expressions which are often used in a figurative context may undergo semantic change, which means that ad hoc concepts may become a new encoded sense. Wilson – Carston (2007) give an example of the words saint and angel which, as a result of frequent use in metaphorical context, may receive a new encoded sense SAINT* and ANGEL* and, therefore, become polysemous. The comprehension of such familiar metaphorical expressions does not involve any ad hoc concept construction and the meaning is retrieved from the mental lexicon in the process of disambiguation, just as the meaning of literal expressions.

4. Relevance Theory: solutions to Glucksberg’s problem

Vega Moreno proposes a solution to the issue of ‘emergent properties’ based on Relevance Theory. She claims that the ‘emergent properties’ are nothing more than just implications derived inferentially which the hearer may use as potential implicatures of the utterance. To illustrate this case let us consider the following example:

(3) Doctor: I am afraid the surgeon who performed a caesarean on your wife perforated both ovaries. I had no choice but to remove them.
Husband: I want that surgeon out of the hospital. That surgeon is a butcher!
(Vega Moreno 2004: 298)

When the hearer hears a sentence above they may retrieve from memory the concepts SURGEON and BUTCHER and the assumptions that surgeons must be highly skilled and precise as well as delicate in order not to harm their patients, and that butchers cut meat in a way that is far from gentleness and precision. The hearer adds these assumptions to the context and derives the implication that the surgeon does not have necessary skills required in his job. Further on, the hearer may derive inferences that a patient was hurt because of the surgeon’s incompetence and that the surgeon was careless and
negligent, and for this reason should be removed from the hospital and subjected to punishment or trial (Vega Moreno 2004). As a result the hearer will construct the ad hoc concept BUTCHER* denoting people who perform surgeries in a way that is far from precision and delicacy and may cause damage to their patients.

Vega Moreno claims that pragmatic adjustment may not only be applied to concepts which are encoded in the utterance, but also to the concepts encoded in thoughts, which are considered during utterance interpretation. If a hearer hears the sentence *My lawyer is a shark*, they will consider the assumption coming from his knowledge about sharks, that sharks are aggressive. He will then construct the concept AGGRESSIVE* which will be further adjusted to derive implications about lawyers.

On the assumption that the client is satisfied with his lawyer the concept AGGRESSIVE* may be adjusted to denote positive aggressiveness, (AGGRESSIVE**) if the client is afraid of his lawyer, the concept AGGRESSIVE* may be adjusted to denote negative aggressiveness (AGGRESSIVE***; Vega Moreno 2004).

5. Idiom comprehension in Relevance Theory

Vega Moreno (2003, 2005) claims that the idiomatic meaning of idioms such as *spill the beans* is initially imposed on the whole phrase. After the metaphorical sense of the idiom spill the beans is learnt, the hearer applies the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure to construct the idiom’s meaning in a given context. Whenever the hearer encounters the familiar idiomatic string, the hearer, following the path of the least effort, constructs ad hoc concepts: SPILL* which denotes an action of revealing a hidden entity and BEANS* which denotes countable objects. The hearer decodes also the ad hoc concept [[SPILL THE BEANS]]* which is encoded in the whole idiomatic phrase, and which denotes an act of revealing hidden information.

When the hearer encounters the utterance in which the phrase *smell a rat* means idiomatically ‘to know intuitively that something is wrong in the situation, especially that someone is dishonest or deceitful’, they will decode the concepts: SMELL ‘to collect information from the environment using one’s nose’ and RAT ‘a rodent’. Guided by the expectation of relevance they will construct a contextually compatible ad-hoc concept SMELL* constructed through concept broadening to denote an act of intuitive cognition as well as the concept RAT*. The idiom smell a rat seems to convey its meaning through weak implications activated by the concept RAT* (Sperber – Wilson 2006). The encyclopaedic properties of the concept RAT* give access to weak implications of ugliness, grossness and a wide range of
negative connotations (Sperber – Wilson 2006) which map onto the deceit/dishonesty part of the idiomatic meaning. The hearer will also access the concept encoded in the whole phrase [[SMELL A RAT]]* encoding the situation in which someone gets to know intuitively about something being wrong in a situation or about someone being dishonest.

Upon hearing the utterance containing the idiom *kick the bucket* the hearer will decode the concepts KICK ‘to push something abruptly with one’s leg’ and BUCKET ‘a container used for storing liquids’. Following the need for relevance, he will construct the ad hoc concept [[KICK] THE BUCKET]* denoting metaphorically a situation in which someone dies suddenly and within this concept he will construct a broader concept KICK* providing access to the property of kicking being an abrupt, forceful and discrete action, the property which maps onto the manner of death (cf. Sperber – Wilson 2004, 2006; Vega Moreno 2003).

When the hearer encounters the phrase *fly off the handle* in the idiomatic context s/he will decode the literal senses FLY ‘to move in the air’ and HANDLE ‘an object designed to be grasped or held by the hand’, but will take the concepts as the starting point in the inference process and will construct the ad-hoc concept [[FLY] OFF THE HANDLE]* of a metaphorical denotation ‘suddenly lose one’s temper’. Within that concept s/he will construct a loose concept FLY* to denote ‘sudden, fast and uncontrollable action’, and a broader concept HANDLE* denoting the state of ‘being in charge or in control over something’, the properties of which map onto the meaning of the idiom. If the idiomatic phrase is encountered in the sentence in (4) below:

(4) Father will *fly off the handle* when he gets to know that you have sold the house.

the hearer will add the encyclopaedic assumptions from the concepts to the contextual assumption that houses constitute a valuable property and that selling a house without an owner’s permission will certainly make him angry, and will arrive at the interpretation that will satisfy his expectations of relevance. According to Vega Moreno (2003), idioms such as *skating on thin ice* are completely transparent and evoke their metaphorical meaning as a whole phrase.

(5) Lending money to John is *skating on thin ice*.

When the hearer hears the idiomatic phrase, in order to arrive at the intended speaker’s meaning, they may consider the assumptions that skating on thin ice is a dangerous, life-threatening activity. From his knowledge about lending money they may assume that lending money to some people is
risky because they may not return the borrowed sum. As a result the hearer will construct an ad hoc concept [SKATING ON THIN ICE]* with the denotation “risky action” and will conclude that lending money to John is endowed with risk because John is not a person to rely on and that is why he will not pay back the money.

6. Polysemy and idiom variants

As a consequence of polysemous meaning, two meanings of the idiom co-occur in the process of comprehension. One reason to claim that in idiomatic phrases literal and metaphorical meanings run in parallel is that phrases which function as idioms in the idiomatic context function also as literal phrases in the literal context. In the examples below only the literal meaning is activated, the idiomatic meaning is suppressed by the context:

(6) (a) My dog smelt a rat in the garden.
(b) My one year old son spilled the beans all over the floor.
(c) I kicked the bucket with paint and stained the new carpet.

What also speaks for the duality of the idiom’s meaning is that in a context which allows for an ambiguous meaning both senses are activated in the hearer. The hearer readily grasps the intended literal speaker’s meaning, but the idiomatic meaning is also activated, often causing a humorous effect. Let us consider the following example from Giora (2003: 19):

(7) Iddo and Omri are eating supper together. Iddo fetches himself a glass of juice out of the refrigerator.
Omri: I want to drink too.
Iddo’s mother: Iddo, totci lo et ha-mic (‘take the juice out [of the refrigerator] for him’)
Iddo (laughingly): ha...ha...le-hotci lo et ha-mic (to take/squeeze the juice out of him – a Hebrew idiom meaning ‘drive one crazy’).

The boy starts laughing which means that he grasped both senses, the literal one, intended by his mother, and the idiomatic meaning which was not intended.

However, probably the most important argument speaking for the duality of idiom’s meaning is that idioms do not always occur in their standard form. Language users often create idiom variants by rearranging idiom’s constituents and adding new words to the idiom’s structure in order to modify the information conveyed by the idiom or to enrich it with a new sense. Idioms in alternative forms are constructed when the speaker refers to the literal meaning of the idiom, but the meaning they intend to convey is...
idiomatic (Fernando 1996: 48). To illustrate this claim, let us look at the example from Glucksberg (2001: 73):

(8) A: Did the old man **kick the bucket** last night?
   B: Nah, he barely **nudged it**.”

In the example above, the speaker refers to the literal meanings of the verbs *kick* and *nudge*, while the meaning they have in mind is idiomatic. What is more, such idiom alternations are created spontaneously and effortlessly by the speaker and are comprehended by the hearer with equal ease.

According to Glucksberg (2001), when polysemy is established for both idiom and its constituents, the variants of the canonical form may be processed just as literal phrases, by retrieving contextually motivated word meanings and performing linguistic analysis of the word meanings and the grammatical structure of the idiom.

Vega Moreno (2003, 2005) developed a four-step idiom variants comprehension procedure. With an example of *nudge the bucket*, a variant of the familiar standard idiom *kick the bucket*, the first step will involve construction of an ad hoc concept NUDGE*, which unlike KICK*, denotes an action of pushing something gently. As the next step, the standard idiomatic phrase [[KICK] THE BUCKET]* with the denotation ‘die suddenly’ will be retrieved from memory. The third step involves combining the encyclopaedic assumptions from the idiom constituent NUDGE* and from the whole idiomatic phrase in its standard form. The last step in the process of comprehension is the construction of an ad hoc concept [[NUDGE] THE BUCKET]* with the denotation ‘die peacefully’.

7. An alternative approach to idiom comprehension

The comprehension procedure of idioms in their standard forms, described by Vega Moreno (2003, 2005), seems not to be applied whenever the idiom is heard. Instead, it seems to take place only at the beginning of idiom’s meaning comprehension. An ad hoc concept formation seems to operate only when the idiomatic string is heard for the first time. Once the idiom’s meaning is learnt, it enters the mental lexicon as just another literal sense. After that, the ad hoc concept construction is no longer needed.

When the hearer hears the idiom for the first time, the figurative meaning is imposed on the whole idiomatic phrase [spill the beans]* ‘reveal secrets’. Overtime the idiom’s constituents acquire their metaphorical meanings SPILL*, via concept broadening, which starts to be associated with the act of revealing and BEANS*, via concept narrowing, which comes to be associated with secrets. At this point idiom’s constituents become polysemous.
Since idioms are metaphorical expressions, it is plausible to claim that they are understood similarly to metaphors. In particular, familiar idioms may be regarded as familiar metaphors and understood according to Sperber – Wilson (2006) and Wilson – Carston’s (2007) theories. Let us look at the following exchange:

(9) Anne: Why are you so upset John?
John: Jane spilled the beans.

In this context John is making a salad for his birthday party, Jane is 3 years old and is John’s younger sister. Given that the idiom *spill the beans* is familiar to Anne, comprehension of the phrase involves only disambiguation between two encoded literal senses:

**SPILL THE BEANS 1** ‘throw legumes from a container’
**SPILL THE BEANS 2** ‘reveal secrets’

Since the context is literal, Ann will use her background knowledge about little children (e.g. inattentiveness, clumsiness) to arrive at a valid inference. The sense that will gain relevance is **SPILL THE BEANS 1**.

If we place the same exchange in a metaphorical context in which Jane is John’s best friend and knows all his secrets, the comprehension of the phrase *spill the beans* will again involve only disambiguation between the two encoded literal senses:

**SPILL THE BEANS 1** ‘throw legumes from a container’
**SPILL THE BEANS 2** ‘reveal secrets’

In the metaphorical context the meaning that will be most highly activated is **SPILL THE BEANS 2**. It will achieve relevance by implying that Jane told everyone about John’s secrets.

The same comprehension process will take place in the case of the idiom *smell a rat*. The examples in (a) and (b) show the use of the idiom in different contexts.

(10) (a) My dog *smelt a rat* in the garden.
(b) Susan *smelt a rat* when her husband started to come back home late at night.

In both cases the comprehension of the familiar idiom *smell a rat* will involve disambiguation between two encoded literal senses:

**SMELL A RAT 1** ‘to perceive the scent of a rodent by means of the olfactory organ’.
**SMELL A RAT 2** ‘to know intuitively that something is wrong in the situation, especially that someone is dishonest or deceitful’.
In the literal context in (a) the sense that is most highly activated and gains relevance is SMELL A RAT 1, while in the metaphorical context in (b) the sense that is most highly activated is SMELL A RAT 2. The meaning achieves relevance by implying that Susan intuitively felt that her husband commits infidelity.

8. Idiom variants

Taking this into consideration, it is justified to claim that idiom variants may be regarded as spontaneous metaphors, as opposed to familiar metaphors in the sense of Sperber – Wilson (2006) and Wilson – Carston (2007). In the case of idiomatic expressions in their altered form, it is unfeasible to store in memory all their possible versions and meanings, as secondary literal senses, just as it happens in the case of idioms in their canonical form. From the point of view of Relevance Theory, it seems much less effort consuming to construct the meaning of an idiom variant ad hoc, whenever the string is heard (cf. Vega Moreno 2003, 2005). To illustrate how the idiom variant pour the beans would be comprehended, let us consider the following dialogue:

(11) Anne: Why are you so upset, John?
    John: Jane poured the beans to everyone.

The context of this exchange is metaphorical: Jane is John’s best friend and knows all his secrets. Upon hearing the utterance containing the idiom variant pour the beans, Anne, following the path of the least effort, will decode the concept POUR which denotes an action of making the liquid flow from a container, and the concept BEANS denoting ‘edible legumes’. In the process of adjustment she will construct the ad hoc concept POUR* with a broader denotation of any activity of throwing something lavishly from a container as well as the narrower concept BEANS* denoting ‘countable objects’. The hearer will also retrieve from memory the whole idiomatic string [[SPILL THE BEANS]]* in its standard form, which denotes an action of revealing secrets. The hearer will consider in parallel the encyclopaedic assumptions form both the concept encoded in the constituents POUR* and BEANS*, and from the one encoded in the whole idiomatic phrase in its standard form to arrive at a valid inference. As a result she will construct an ad hoc concept [[POUR THE BEANS]]* with the denotation ‘tell lavishly about someone’s secrets’. The phrase [[POUR THE BEANS]]* will then achieve relevance by implying that Jane, in a very lavish manner, told everyone about John’s secrets.

Let us now consider the example below:
When the hearer hears the utterance (12), s/he will decode the concepts encoded in the words *smell*, *huge* and *rat*: *smell* ‘to perceive the scent of something by means of the olfactory organ’, *huge* ‘extremely big’ and *rat* ‘a rodent’. Guided by the expectation of relevance the hearer will construct an ad hoc concept *SMELL* by concept broadening, to denote an act of intuitive cognition, an ad hoc concept *RAT* constructed through concept narrowing, the encyclopaedic properties of which give access to the weak implications of ugliness, grossness and a wide array of other negative connotations (cf. Sperber – Wilson 2006) The hearer will also construct the ad hoc concept *HUGE* loosened to denote something reinforced, bigger and stronger than usual. They will also retrieve from memory the concept encoded in the standard form of the idiom [[SMELL A RAT]]* denoting a situation in which someone gets to know about dishonesty or deceit using one’s own intuition. Through considering together the concepts underlying the separate words and the whole idiomatic string in its canonical form, the hearer will arrive at the implication that the speaker knows intuitively that something very wrong and dishonest is happening. As the result of the implication the hearer will construct the ad hoc concept [[SMELL A HUGE RAT]]*. It will then achieve relevance by implying that John intuitively got to know about dishonesty within the business in question.

9. Conclusions

The article shows that familiar idioms in their standard forms may be regarded as familiar metaphors and may be understood according to the theory outlined in Wilson – Carston (2007). In the case of well-known idioms an ad hoc concept construction operates only at the initial stage of idiom’s meaning acquisition, and not whenever the figurative phrase is heard. Idiom variants may be perceived as novel, spontaneous metaphors and in the process of comprehension of idiom variants, ad hoc concept formation must be applied every time the idiomatic string is heard.

The article presented an alternative account of the comprehension of idiomatic expressions, combining the theories developed by Glucksberg (2001), Vega Moreno (2003, 2005) as well as Sperber – Wilson (2006) and Wilson – Carston (2007). The account finds justification in Relevance Theory. Following the path of the least effort the hearer, via disambiguation, retrieves from the mental lexicon the second literal sense encoded in the familiar idiomatic phrase. The metaphorical meanings of idioms in their standard forms are conventionalised, highly predictable and commonly found
in speaking and writing. For this reason they are worth being stored in memory. Retrieving their meaning from mental lexicon in a simple disambiguation process is a shortcut effort-saving comprehension procedure. In the case of standard-form idioms it would be uneconomical and pointless to construct the familiar meaning anew on every occasion when the idiom is heard. Idiom variants, though, occur spontaneously in the conversation and serve a particular purpose. They may be called one-off expressions, because once they fulfilled their conversational task, they fall into non-existence. There is virtually an infinite number of possible alternations and meanings of idiom variants, and language users are unable to predict which meaning they will come across. What is more, storing all the possible idiom variants with their meanings takes storage space. Hence, it would be extremely effort-consuming, and probably even unfeasible for a human mind, to store in memory all the possible senses that may emerge in different contexts. For this reason it is more economical to apply the ad hoc concept formation procedure and construct the meaning of an idiom variant from scratch.

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INVESTIGATING AND ACCOUNTING FOR LEXICO-SEMANTIC CHANGES AFFECTING A CONCEPTUAL CATEGORY IN MEDIAEVAL ENGLISH*

Review article


The study under investigation falls into three parts: part one, “Methodology and theoretical framework”, including primary sources (1–26), part two, “The Synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Old English” (51–86), part three, “The Synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Middle English” (87–132) and “The Synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Middle English Dialects” (133–145). The results of the study will be examined in some detail.

Chapter One “Introduction” (1–26) explains the purpose of the study (1.1) which “is to investigate and account for the lexico-semantic changes affecting the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN”. The author enumerates five points: (a) “tracing the diachronic developments within the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN”; (b) “categorizing items within the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN (...);” (c) “establishing conceptual domains relating to the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN”; (d) “investigating and explaining the process of the loss of native vocabulary and its replacement by borrowings from French (...); (e) “investigating the distribution of items within the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN in Old and Middle English texts and dialects.” (p. 1)

The subchapter “Methodology and theoretical framework in the study” (1.2/1–2) tells the reader: “The present study adopts the findings of cognitive
linguistics as a theoretical framework." More precisely, the author opts for "prototype theory" (p. 2). These points are being treated more in extenso in the following chapter. In addition, a list of sources consulted appears under the same chapter (1.2.a–h/2). All these sources are being discussed and presented in what follows (1.3–1.5/3–18). Old English primary texts (1.4/4–9) and Middle English primary texts (1.5/9–18) are conveniently listed in tables which give date, title and manuscript of the text in question.

The last subchapter, “The synonyms of hill and mountain in Medieval English: a preliminary investigation” (1.6/19–26), introduces the conceptual domains HILL and MOUNTAIN, referring to the distinctive feature HEIGHT (p. 19). The fossilized members of the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN are listed in Table 14 (p. 21), while Table 15 (p. 22) displays eight peripheral items. There remain “thirty-five items attested in Old and Middle English literature, whose meaning ‘hill, mountain’ persisted for some time or survived until Modern English” (listed in Table 16, pp. 22–23). The data from Table 16 are graphically represented in Figure 1 (p. 24), which documents their first (and eventually last) attestation.

Chapter Two deals with “Semantic and lexical change in English” (27–50) from a theoretical viewpoint. The discussion comprises the following subchapters: 2.1 “Lexical semantics and semantic change” (27ff.); 2.2 “Pre-structuralist approaches” (29ff.); 2.3 “Structuralist approaches” (33ff.), 2.4 “Semantics within generative grammar” (35ff.), 2.5. “Componental analysis” (37ff.) and 2.6 “Cognitive semantics” (40ff.) is certainly not meant to be exhaustive. For a discussion of the two approaches, see Leonhard Lipka, “Prototype semantics or feature semantics: an alternative.” [In:]. Festschrift Hüllen, vol. 1 (1987), 282–298. As far as componental analysis of verbs in general is concerned, see C. Kay and M.L. Samuels (1975). “Componental analysis in semantics: its validity and applications” [In:] Transactions of the Philological Society, 49–81, may be worth quoting.

Referring to Kleparski’s approach (1997: 128), the author aptly illustrates the functioning of various CONCEPTUAL DOMAINS which are to determine the semantic development of ModE wench (Figure 3/p. 44). On the following page Figure 4 shows the conceptual integration network for <BOY>/<SERVANT> ‘boy in service’, which is taken from Grygiel (2008: 58). The present reviewer earlier dealt with the related lexical fields BOY/GIRL – SERVANT – CHILD in Middle English (1985), 328–336.

Under subchapter 2.7.2, “Diachronic onomasiology” (47ff.), we read as follows: “The basic onomasiological mechanisms include word formation and word creation processes, blending, ellipsis, folk etymology, borrowing of foreign words or elements.” (p. 47). As the discussion of the integration of the French loanword mountain, which ousted native bergh (< OE beorg), in Chapter Four (pp. 105–106, 108) shows, the author seems to lay more
emphasis on the latter category (i.e. on borrowing) than on the preceding ones.

The summary (2.8/50) very briefly restates the author’s choice of “diachronic prototype semantics, formulated within cognitive linguistics (…)”, as “the most useful tool in accounting for changes in meaning.”

Under Chapter Three the author begins to investigate “The synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Old English” (51–86). On p. 51 (and on the following pages) OE hlaew ‘hill, burial mound’ appears without a length-mark on the vowel; see in particular subchapter 3.2.4 (73–74). In fact, Old English records two variants: hlaew and hlāw (Holthausen 1974: 162). However, its Middle English continuation loue ‘hill, mound’ (Southern English low) can only go back to the latter variant. This is also true of Scottish law, both archaic in Modern English (see subchapter 4.4.2 Loue/108–110).

The problem of a possible etymological relationship of beorg ‘hill, mountain’ and cognate beorgan ‘to protect, shelter’ on the one hand, and burg ‘(fortified) town, stronghold’, surviving as ModE borough, on the other hand, is being discussed by the author, who refers to conflicting scholarly views. Following Kluge/Seebold (24th edition 2002), s.v. Burg, a definite solution does not seem to be at hand.

In fact, there is a certain imbalance between Chapter Three “The Synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Old English” (51–86) and the ensuing part of the study which deals with Middle English, namely Chapter Four “The synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Middle English” (87–132), to which Chapter Five “The synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Middle English dialects” (133–145) is to be added. Some 35 pages for Old English may have to stand up against 58 pages for Middle English. The concluding remarks (146–148) give a brief summary of the results of the present study.

Chapter Four deals with “The synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Middle English” (87–132). In the course of the discussion of the prototypical members of the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN (4.3/90ff.), the author rightly states: “Summing up, the data in Table 28 clearly show that the core of the onomasiological structure of the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN underwent a significant change in Medieval English.” (p. 94). In fact, ME bergh (< OE beorg) radically declined in frequency and was no longer used in its original meaning during the 15th century (see Table 28, p. 92). Being one of the prototypical members of the conceptual category in question during the Old English period (see Chap. 3/ p. 54, Table 18), it had to give way to mountain, a borrowing from French.

A well-founded distinction is made between Old and Early Middle English munt (see 3.2.2/67–71), which is a direct borrowing from Lat. montem obl.sing. of mons ‘mountain’, which was mainly restricted to the names of
mountains in biblical texts, and ME *mount* (from the same Latin etymon) which was re-borrowed from Anglo-French (4.2.3/97–98). ME *mount* was at first more or less synonymous with *mountain* and attained an unusual high frequency during the 15th century (Table 28, p. 92). In Modern English, *mount* is no longer used as a synonym of *mountain*, but usually precedes names of mountains, though it may still occur as an independent lexeme in poetical texts.

From the Corpus Manuscript of the Ancrene Riwle/Wisse (a1200?/c1230; ed. Bella Millett 2006: 414a), *munt* ‘hill, mountain’ (2.846, etc.), as well as *Munt Calwaere* ‘Mount Calvary’ (4.1147–1148) and *Munt of Muntgiw* ‘Mount Mountjoy’, i.e. ‘the Alps’ (6.457n), may be added to the examples quoted by the author (4.2.3/97–98).

The reasons for the demise of ME *bergh* (< OE *beorg*) are being discussed under subchapter 4.4.1 (pp. 105–106, 108). Since there are more examples when French loans ousted native core members of a lexical field in medieval English, I doubt whether a teleological approach advocated by Adamska-Sałaciak, quoted on p. 108 (72), will tell the whole truth. Baugh – Cable5 (2006; chapter 6, paragraphs 123ff./pp. 163ff) give some areas of daily and public life, which aptly illustrate the extent of French influence on (Middle) English vocabulary.

Following OED3: *mound* n.2 (LME – 15th century), this lexeme could be added to the peripheral material such as *hillock, holme, mote* (4.4.4/pp. 112ff.). The author has given MOUND the status of a conceptual category both for Middle English (4.2/p. 89, Table 11) and Old English (3.1/p. 53, Figure 5).

One wonders whether ME *hoge* ‘hill’, one of the peripheral nouns of the conceptual categories HILL/MOUNTAIN (13th–15th c.), attested only once (4.4/p. 102, Table 29; see also 4.5.4/p. 113) is identical with Northern ME *hough* 4.5.2/pp. 121f., a rarely attested word of difficult origin. While *hough* and *ogh* may well continue OE *hoh, ME howis* ‘hills’ may go back to OE *hoge* and show the vocalization of the voiced back spirant (p. 121, 87a, b).

The monograph under scrutiny may have its weaknesses after all. After a highly interesting first half of Chapter Four (Middle English), there follow a few subchapters (4.4.4/pp. 112ff.; 4.5/pp. 116ff.), which deal with items of extremely low frequency, some lexemes, such as above-quoted ME *hoge* ‘hill’, attested only once. A conclusion of the type “This single occurrence (of ME *lith*) is not sufficient to draw any definite conclusions regarding its meaning and use.” (4.5.5/p. 126) may well be applied to nearly all the items dealt with in this section.

There is only one reference to the so-called Online Etymology Dictionary, s.v. cloud: O.E. *clud* ‘mass of rock,’ related to *clod*, a metaphoric extension (13c.) based on the similarity of cumulus clouds and rock masses. The Old English word for ‘cloud’ was *weolcan*. In Middle English, *skie* also originally
meant ‘cloud’. The verb is from the early 15th century. This passage was referred to by the author in connection with the discussion of the alleged shift from ‘a mass of rock/earth’ to ‘a mass of water vapour’ (4.5.2/ p. 120). In fact, the meaning ‘rock, hill’ is earlier attested than the meaning ‘cloud’ (see OED2: cloud). There may be indeed a change of the referent, obviously based on the assumed similarity.

Professor Anatoly Liberman, University of Minnesota, one of the leading etymologists (personal communication of 30 June 2011), states that cloud may well go back to the same root as the words clod/clot (and even clutter), which denote an undifferentiated mass.

The “Summary” (4.6/131–32) reads as follows: “(1) As a result of lexical enrichment, the number of loanwords in the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN “rose” (not “raised”), the source languages being Scandinavian (...), Romance (...) and Celtic.” (p. 131). (4) In view of the lexical and semantic changes, the items included in the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN were shuffled. The core of the semantic field in question changed, mainly as a result of the semantic narrowing of ME bergh and the introduction of F mountaine.” (p. 132).

Chapter Five, “The synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Middle English dialects” (133–145) may be in need of some justification. It may well be intended to test some earlier conclusions on Middle English dialects.

Besides Chapter Three, “The synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Old English” (51–86), an additional chapter entitled “The synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Old English dialects” would not have made sense, as the bulk of the texts which survived were written in only one dialect: the so-called West Saxon dialect, which, until the Norman Conquest (1066), served as kind of scripta, i.e. a written supra-regional standard.

However, some arguments in favour of Chapter Five should be adduced. Indeed Chapter Five, “The synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Middle English dialects” (133–145), follows upon Chapter Four: “The synonyms of HILL and MOUNTAIN in Middle English” (87–132). The Middle English legacy of texts and documents which have come down to us is much greater than the Old English one. Yet the study “suffers from certain unavoidable deficiencies caused by the uneven spread of the texts in the five dialects.” (5.0/p. 133). Anyway, as far as the material basis is concerned, there certainly may be some unavoidable overlap between Chapters Four and Five.

Some particular remarks may be called for. The author tries to make a case for the South Western dialect “revealing certain archaic flavour,” (5.3/p. 139). The present writer wonders whether the differences between the East Midland and the West Midland dialects were really insignificant, as the author would have us believe (5.5/p. 140) referring to a study by Skeat, first published in 1912, reprinted 1973.
Later, the author refers to Professor Fisiak’s handbook (2000: 84) in connection with alleged late Middle English “prototypes” of the written English standard, as illustrated by some 15th century manuscripts (5.6/p. 142). Regarding the rise of (written) Standard English, she should have referred to the recent publication of essays on the subject by 14 scholars, edited by Laura Wright, *The Development of Standard English, 1300–1800. Theories, Descriptions, Conflicts*. (Studies in English Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Undoubtedly, it is a problem that may deserve a comprehensive investigation which lies well beyond the aims of the study under review.

The “Summary” (5.8/145) explains that “The four most frequent items are found in all five dialects, even in the underrepresented Kentish dialect.” This is in fact true of ME *hille, mount, mountaine, doune* (Table 38/p. 135).

“The concluding remarks” (pp. 146–148) give a brief summary of the results of the present study. The following statements seem to carry particular weight: whether a word will be assigned the status of prototypicality or not, depends to a large extent on its frequency in the sources consulted (p. 146). For the sources, see Chapter Two (pp. 27ff.). In Chapter Four the author had shown that the French loanword *mountain* eventually replaced native *bergh* (< OE *beorg*) (Chapter Four/pp. 105–106, 108), which had lost its most prototypical features, corresponding to the conceptual category HILL/MOUNTAIN. ME *bergh* (North. E *bargs*) survived as ModE *barrow*, meaning ‘burial mound’ in an archeological context (p. 147).

The reader will not always agree with Sądęj-Sobolewska’s conclusions, but the layout of her study is very user-friendly due to numerous tables and figures which serve as a welcome illustration. Unfortunately, there are quite a few typos and errors (see below). This is not to detract from the merits of the dissertation under review which is methodologically well-founded and comes up with convincing results.

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Appendix

To conclude a few corrections and comments may be called for: