No More Uncertain: The Future of the Gurkhas in the British Army

Abstract

Nepalese soldiers, known as the Gurkhas, have been serving in the British Army for over 200 years and have become to be considered an integral part of this military organization. Their long history of service includes participation in the two world wars, as well as the more recent combat missions in the Middle East. However, some call the existence of their military participation a colonial legacy of British imperialism. The aim of this paper is to answer the question on the future of the Nepalese soldiers in the United Kingdom. The study is primarily based on the findings of the 1989 Defence Committee Report regarding the situation and prospects of the Brigade of the Gurkhas, which is juxtaposed with the most recent dispatches and research dealing with the British Army in general and with the Gurkhas themselves.

Keywords: Gurkhas, British imperialism, war, the Middle East conflict

The subject of labour migration in Nepal has been of growing interest to scholars since it began to impact the economy as well the socio-cultural environment of the Himalayan country (see Speck; Malla and Rosenbaum; Bossavie and Denisova). Despite the unprecedented scale of foreign migration and employment opportunities abroad, working for the British Army continues to be a top choice for many Nepalese. Becoming a Gurkha, as those who enlist are called, is equated with the prospect of financial stability, possibility of further education and overall high labour standards that hardly any other employer could provide (Sijapati and Limbu 23). Over the past two centuries, geopolitical processes shaping the country’s policies influenced the army’s strength and composition, adjusting it accordingly to the times of war and peace. The crumbling of the British Empire in the twentieth century significantly reduced the need for troops. Yet, the Gurkhas have weathered. Despite the fact that in the last decade the defence expenditure in Britain has decreased (Dempsey, 5 November 2018) along with the overall size of the army (Dempsey, 12 June 2018), the Brigade of Gurkhas should have no reasons for concern.
The aim of this study is to investigate the reasons behind increased recruitment of Nepalese citizens to the British Army in the period from 1947 to the present day in spite of the growing costs of maintaining the Brigade, as well as reductions in the defence expenditure and the general downsizing of the armed forces. An initial inquiry into the history of the Gurkhas’ presence in the British Army showed that most of the decisions affecting the shape of the Brigade were taken according to the changing geopolitical situation, involved short-term planning and were subject to last-minute modifications. The image of the Gurkhas that emerges from my research is that of soldiers in the British Army uncertain about the future. There appears to be no concern on the part of the British public that the Brigade may be dissolved entirely. The fate of Gurkhas in the British Army demands an enquiry, the more so as there exist no critical works on the subject matter. There is also a lack of recent accessible reports on the Gurkhas in the British Army comparable to the 1989 Defence Committee First Report on the Future of the Brigade of Gurkhas which was a comprehensive overview of the Gurkhas in the British Armed Forces. For the purposes of my analysis, this overview has been supplemented by more contemporary media releases, parlamentary debates, and government reports.

1. Recruiting Gurkhas: A Historical Background

The recruitment of Gurkhas has been a controversial practice from the very outset. Although some critics claim that the tradition should end for it is an “outdated colonial practice” (Kissoon 1), “an instrument of British imperialism” (Sangroula 32), or “an affront to the national honour of Nepal” (“Mercenaries’ and Others”), no organisation has ever officially called for its discontinuation (Laksamba et al. 11). The official Anglo-Nepalese relations were established in 1816 as a result of the Treaty of Segauli, ending a two-year-long armed conflict which brought Gurkhas’ fighting qualities to British attention. By recruiting the Nepalese, the British aimed to reduce the risk of being re-attacked by the Nepalese army in the future (Caplan 27–28). In the turbulent early nineteenth century it was better for the British Empire to avoid another conflict on the Indian subcontinent, particularly when the spoils of war were few and the enemy fierce (Husain 111). The choice to cultivate friends and not create foes proved fortunate as in 1857 the British were in a great need for the former.

The Indian Mutiny, or the First War of Indian Independence, sparked by the introduction of the lubricated Enfield Rifle cartridges, turned Bengal troops against their colonial rulers. For the Hindu and Muslim sepoys oral contact with the cartridges covered in animal grease was a religious insult. The rebellion deemed native troops untrustworthy while the loyalty of the Gurkhas, on the contrary, laid foundations for their further recognition (Wood 1). Also, the belief
that these men were biologically and culturally predisposed to war heavily influenced the recruitment policies from the 1880s until the 1910s. By 1914, 75 per cent of the native infantry was composed mostly of Punjabi Sikhs and Nepalese Gurkhas who were considered an example of military and masculine excellence. In truth, however, the reason behind the shifting of the recruiting base from the Bengal and lower India to the Punjab and Nepal was the need to exclude the politically suspect populations from the military (Streets 385–386). The policies leading to this change in the ethnic composition of the army were in line with the martial-race ideology which was used to categorise native people into martial or non-martial groups (Omissi 32).

The notion of martial races created by the British for the purposes of British imperialism after 1857 did not spread to the Old Continent. The fact that throughout the nineteenth century the Nepalese served mainly on the frontiers of India kept them away from the wider European theatres of conflict. The situation changed when the Gurkhas were brought to France and Turkey during the Great War. Over 114,000 Nepalese soldiers, out of whom 20,000 lost their lives, fought for the British during the conflict (Harclerode and Reynolds 15–23). The numbers were greater during World War II as between 1941–1945, out of a total 200,000 Nepalese enlisted, over 25,000 were casualties (Rai 215). The Gurkhas served in North Africa, South-East Asia, Europe, and in the Middle East. The two world wars brought the well-established martial-race theory into question as “the strategy had been possible only because the peacetime Indian Army took so few recruits in relation to the Indian population as a whole” (Omissi 38). When troops had become required in substantial numbers, the recruiters turned to ethnic groups which had a less outstanding military record. Their immediate success in battle showed that “all men are brave, that the humblest follower is capable of sacrifice and devotion” (qtd. in Omissi 39). With ‘martiality’ deemed a colonial tool of subjugation and division in the 1940s, the Gurkhas’ extraordinary valour, assured by the number of Victoria Cross awards, became a quality they were to become permanently associated with.

For the Nepalese, one of the most significant outcomes of World War II was Indian independence. The 1947 transition, which was marked by widespread violence caused by religious intolerance, saw the Nepalese engaged on the streets of Indian cities (Gould 302–303). In the meantime, the future of the ten British-Indian Army Gurkha regiments was debated by the all parties concerned (Des Chene 179–180). In the late 1940s, Britain still needed to garrison troops in Iraq, Ceylon, Burma, Borneo, Singapore, and Hong Kong, therefore the government tried to retain some of its imperial soldiers for that purpose. Ultimately, it was agreed that the 2nd, 6th, 7th and 10th Gurkha regiments would be transferred to the British Army while the remaining six would be incorporated into the independent Indian Army (Basnyat 231–233). The absence of a worldwide conflict after World War II did not prevent the Gurkhas from gaining practical military experience. The Nepalese played a key role in ensuring stability in South-East Asia and performed
peacekeeping duties in Cyprus in the 1970s as well as in former Yugoslavia in
the 1990s. However, the most spectacular and widely remembered operation took
place in 1982 during the Falklands War/the Malvinas War where a battalion of
Gurkhas participated in the retaking of the islands. The Argentinians surrendered
without combat and, according to observers, the instant success was possible due
to the Gurkhas’ fearsome reputation (Pahari 10). Most recently, Nepalese soldiers
took part in the invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s and have been present in the
Middle East ever since (Bullock 248–252).

2. The Shrinking Brigade

In the early 1950s, a new chapter began for those Gurkhas who left India. Although
they remained in Asia (Malaya), they had to accommodate the policies of their
‘new’ employer which were difficult to predict. At first, the situation was stable as
separate units of Gurkha Engineers, Signals and Transport Regiment were raised
in order to make the brigade self-reliant (Rathur 107–108). Then, the following
decade brought anything but positive news. After the mission on Borneo in 1962,
the first cuts affecting 5,000 of the 15,000 soldiers enlisted were announced. The
Defence Review five years later set a new objective at only 6,000 men by 1971
making some soldiers believe that it was the end of the British Gurkhas. Christo-
pher Bullock recalls that the news “coming so soon after the first announcement,
was a shattering blow to the Brigade of Gurkhas and out of a total of 180 British
officers, 80, including some of middle rank, seeing no future, left the Army while
three transferred to British units” (202). Ultimately, the units settled at the total
number of 6,700 men in order to support the army’s deployment in Northern
Ireland. Three of the five battalions were to be stationed in Hong Kong, one in
Brunei, and one in the United Kingdom (Bullock 205). The 1980s and the 1990s
further undermined the position of Gurkhas in the army as, partly due to internal
changes, the Brigade was once more on the verge of being disbanded. Again,
the Nepalese managed to avoid the worst fate but did not escape unhurt as their
strength was reduced to 4,000 soldiers.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989 prompted another discussion on the
future of the armed forces in the new political situation. The Options for Change
review presented Gurkhas with three scenarios, none of which was entirely posi-
tive. They were: immediate disbandment, disbandment in 1997, or retention of
the Brigade to a strength of 2,500 men. In the end, maintaining some Gurkhas
in Asia proved the most practical since troops were still needed in Hong Kong
(Bullock 220–227). The end of the Cold War did not bring peace and stability
as it was predicted by the authors of the review. In the early 1990s, the Gurkhas
had a chance to respond to new threats in international security and prove to be
a fully-adaptable military force needed in the twenty-first century. In the years
leading to the next 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of the armed forces the government’s attitude towards the Gurkhas had changed, and full disbandment was no longer an option. In 1995 the members of the House of Commons commented on the manning difficulties in the army by saying that “the Government’s answer is to take on more Gurkhas” (House of Commons 1995, Vol. 264, 113) and that “the Parachute Regiment may be required to enlist Gurkhas” (House of Commons 1995, Vol. 264, 80). Although the Brigade was not referred to in the SDR, the review stated that there would be no significant changes in the size of the regular infantry (The Strategic Defence Review 1998, 38–40).

3. The Thriving Brigade

The first decade of the twenty-first century put Gurkhas in the spotlight. While being trained and permanently stationed in Britain, they gradually grew conscious of their social and legal situation. Their terms and conditions of service dating back to the 1947 Tripartite Agreement deprived Gurkhas of equality in terms of payment, promotion opportunities and settlement rights. When Peter Carroll, a Liberal Democrat councillor in Folkestone, began representing the Gurkhas’ interests, a number of organizations, and, most notably the actress Joanna Lumley, supported the Nepalese in their legal struggle for fair treatment (Carroll 14–66). The government tried to stop the proposed changes to the immigration policy which would encompass over 30,000 people. The main argument against the Gurkha settlement was the cost, estimated at £4.5 billion. Yet, the taxpayers were unimpressed by such financial concerns and in 2009 the Gurkhas were allowed to settle in Britain with their closest relatives (Gillan). Furthermore, in 2007 the pensions of the currently serving Gurkhas had been brought into line with the rest of the Army thus making Gurkhas’ remuneration equal to that of British soldiers (Laksamba et al. 18). In the light of the growing costs of the Brigade, the new legislation indicated that the Nepalese had become more than just the ‘good value for money.’ The Defence Committee 1989 report on “The Future of the Brigade of Gurkhas” stated that “value for money is clearly a key element in assessing what sort of future the Brigade should have. Here the Gurkha case is very strong” (Defence Committee, First Report 1989, 277), while in 1999 Mr George presented Members of Parliament with a list of reasons why Gurkhas’ financial situation had not improved. He said: “we all know the arguments, which are advanced loudly: ‘There is an agreement with India and Nepal; wages are low but we boost them with incidentals; do not shout too loudly because, if the cost of Gurkhas rises too far, they will be dispensed with; the cost of living in Nepal is so low’” (House of Commons 1999, Vol. 334, 488). By 2010 the cost-effectiveness, which kept the brigade as long as they were based in the Far East or earning less than an ordinary British soldier, had lost its validity.
Andrew Dorman, an international security expert, pointed to another reason behind retaining the Gurkhas, namely the “struggle to recruit for most regiments” (“Gurkhas too expensive”). While Dorman called for a reduction in the number of Gurkhas in favour of home-based British soldiers, he did not take into consideration difficulty in attracting enough young men to fill the ranks which was a reason for concern already in 1989 when the difference between the strength and establishment of the infantry was about five per cent (Defence Committee, First Report 1989, 132). At the same time, Mr Hamilton in the House of Commons claimed that “the Government believe it would be wrong to see the retention of the Gurkhas purely as a solution for demographic problems, with the implication that, if those problems disappear, so will the Gurkhas. The Government’s plans are founded on the assumption that, regardless of demography, we shall, on the basis of the information available at present, wish to retain a significant Gurkha force with roles within the mainstream of the Army’s defence commitments” (House of Commons 1989, Vol. 154, 387). In 2018 the Army was still about five per cent short of its strength requirement (Dempsey, 12 June 2018). The Brigade of Gurkhas, however, does not suffer from a lack of candidates which makes competition for available places extremely fierce. Over 10,000 men aged 18–21 applied for the 320 posts available in the 2019 intake, with them having to pass a two-stage selection process where their documents, education and physical fitness were painstakingly verified (King and Moore). The willingness to enlist in the British Army is so great that a number of Gurkha training centres or academies have emerged in Nepal. Their goal is to thoroughly prepare the candidates provided they have financial means to do so (Pattisson). 9

The main reasons for joining Her Majesty’s army have remained largely unchanged since the Defence Committee 1989 report on “The Future of the Brigade of Gurkhas” which listed the following: a family tradition, the ‘glamour’ of the overseas service, an employment opportunity, and money (Defence Committee, First Report 1989, 68). In a documentary commissioned by the British Forces Broadcasting Service in 2012 entitled The Gurkhas of Nepal, interviewees mention the pride that is still associated with becoming a Gurkha and state that the pay is better than in the Middle East (The Gurkhas of Nepal). The Gulf, as well as South-East Asian countries, have recently been employing an increasing number of Nepalese, but great controversies surround the working and living conditions of migrants there (Sijapati and Limbu 23). That said, family traditions, with sons wanting to follow in their father’s footsteps. 10

The situation could not have been more different in Britain. As early as 1989 the Ministry of Defence was looking at the ways of dealing with the predicted shortage of recruits by trying to attract more people from ethnic minority communities or women (Defence Committee, First Report 1989, 150–153). In 2017, Black, Asian and ethnic minority (BAME) candidates became the target of an advertising campaign (“New Army recruitment adverts won’t appeal to new soldiers”), while
in 2019 the army looked to target “not just these sort of hard types which seem to be the perfect image. It wants all sorts of people also those that may not be able to run really fast but can actually sort out and stop people attacking this country by cyber warfare” (Clifton). The shift is fully understandable in a situation when “obesity levels have also increased and the proportion of those eligible to join [the army] has reduced” in Britain (“Manning the Army”). The physical requirements and the fact that young people do not generally consider the army as an attractive career makes Gurkhas an even more desirable option. The army also decided to recruit Nepalese women, saying that it was “consistent with the government’s broader decision to open all ground close combat roles to women” (qtd. in “Gurkhas to recruit women for the first time from 2020”). Some female recruits in Nepal have already started preparing for the future intake (Gurkha Women: ‘It’s my turn to prove myself’).

After the initial cuts conducted by the Ministry of Defence following the introduction of the “Army 2020” restructuring program, the Gurkhas’ situation began to improve. Between 2011 and 2016 the number of Nepalese employed by the army decreased from 3,910 to 2,612 (UK Armed Forces Quarterly Personnel Report). Also in 2016, the Army unexpectedly announced that 642 new posts in the Brigade would be created over the next three years. The soldiers who transferred to other units were welcomed back to their native regiments (“Did you transfer out of the Brigade of the Gurkhas”) and simultaneously the number of Gurkhas recruited in Nepal began to rise. According to the information provided by the Gurkha Brigade Association, the number of Gurkhas recruited in 2018 rose to 270 from 240 in 2016 (“Passing out Parade Catterick 2016,” “Pass Out Parade for Gurkha Intake 2018”). In November 2018, however, the Gurkha Brigade Association announced that until 2021 the number of Gurkhas would increase even more to 3,423 with further 356 posts outside the units (“Brigade of Gurkhas Growth Plans”). Today, the increasing intake of recruits from Nepal is the best indicator that they could become the backbone of the future army, particularly if the negative trend in recruiting at home persists. Furthermore, the Defence Committee 1989 report on “The Future of the Brigade of Gurkhas” pointed out that “a key difference between the Gurkhas and the rest of the British Army is that great efforts have to be made to keep the British soldier in the Army, while it is difficult to persuade the Gurkha soldier to leave” (Defence Committee, First Report 1989, 90). In the 1990s the former served on average for five years while the latter remained in the army usually for fifteen years. The Gurkhas were therefore considered more valuable due to their reliability and experience (Defence Committee, First Report 1989, 90). Although the terms and conditions of service have changed since 1989, the trend continues meaning that an effort and resources invested into training an individual soldier benefits the Army for much longer.

The characteristic of the Nepalese that the British found important in 1989 was their ability to integrate well into local communities (Defence Committee,
Nowadays all recruits are expected to have completed a certain level of education and are required to pass an English language test during the selection. This way the Ministry of Defence ensures good relationships with the local population. The Gurkhas’ importance to the local community of Church Crookham, where the Nepalese soldiers had been based until 2000, was mentioned by Mr. Hancock in the House of Commons in 1999 (House of Commons 1999, Vol. 334, 501). More recently Chris Davies noted “as one walks around Brecon, it warms the heart to see Nepalese people working behind the counter of the local supermarket and involved in our local town council. They are involved in all aspects of society” (House of Commons 2018, Vol. 649, 1079–1080).

Additionally, the Defence Committee 1989 report on “The Future of the Brigade of Gurkhas” states that the Gurkhas did not have any difficulties in integrating into larger military formations and had a proven record of outstanding performance compared to their British counterparts. It reads, for instance, that the Gurkhas’ failure rate in a standard parachuting course was 7 per cent whereas for the native troops the percentage was 50. Furthermore, the authors of the report write “we do not consider that sophistication of equipment would pose any great difficulty, in the mechanised or in other role. Gurkhas can be trained to use highly sophisticated equipment, as the men of Queen’s Gurkha Signals show” (Defence Committee, First Report 1989, 171–172). Due to their adaptability and excellent performance, the Nepalese have recently entered the ranks of the Special Forces. According to military observers, recruiting foreign nationals is a rare practice in such commandos (“Special Operations: SAS has gone Gurkha”). The Gurkhas’ pass rate is at 24 per cent meaning that it is likely that more Nepalese could enter the units in the future for it is considered high. Their cultural background and knowledge of Urdu, which is spoken in Afghanistan and Pakistan, have also been recognized as an advantage (“Special Operations: SAS has gone Gurkha”). The Gurkhas, however, are known for their general ability to communicate: “The Gurkhas seem to have some Babel fish in their ear. Wherever one goes with them, they are always in some way or another able to communicate with the local people. When I was in the Balkans, there were Chileans and people from the area with a Gurkha in the middle. For some reason or another, he was able to make those people understand one another in some fashion” (House of Commons 2011, Vol. 535, 489). The origin and the skills became valuable in the Middle Eastern operations which require gathering of intelligence. According to recent findings, it is no longer the technological advantage that guarantees success on the battlefield, but the cross-cultural awareness that translates into an in-depth understanding of one’s adversaries (Schreiber 143). The emergence of terrorism after September 11, 2001, shifted the emphasis from the conventional warfare common in the twentieth century to high-readiness operations. Specialists predict the future operations to be smaller-scale and expeditionary such as those in the
Balkans, Sierra Leone, East Timor or Afghanistan (The Strategic Defence Review 2002, 10–12); ideally suited to the Gurkhas’ skill-set.

Conclusion

In their 200-year-long history of service, the men from Nepal have managed to retain their military value in spite of the changing geopolitical situations. At first, they were seen through the martial-race theory and later considered ‘value for money.’ When the financial interpretation of the Gurkhas’ presence in the British Army had been dismissed in the early 2010s Ministry of Defence scrutinized manpower problems it has been experiencing since the end of the Cold War. In comparison with the native recruits the Nepalese willingly fill the ranks and are considered reliable soldiers due to a high retention rate. Furthermore, an array of qualities they have fits into the frame of predictions about the future made by the Ministry of Defence in the recent years. As the Gurkhas have shown multiple times, they can respond quickly and efficiently to any threat at any given location. While the entire Armed Forces undergo restructuring and are subject to cuts, the Brigade of Gurkhas recruits an increasing number of Nepalese men who are eager to commit their best years to military service. The Ministers recognize that it is a rare quality among the British and that for this reason the ‘Gurkha connection’ should be maintained. The recruitment is a vital link which, if cut impulsively, could have devastating consequences. The British would lose access to a willing pool of recruits as well as face requests of compensation for the long decades of discriminatory treatment of the Nepalese soldiers while the Nepalese, on the other hand, would lose remittances which are a major part of their country’s GDP.13 For the time being, the position of the Gurkhas in the British Army is not threatened by any internal or external factors. Yet, no matter how well-grounded the arguments may seem today, the future remains unpredictable.

Notes

2 This study does not aim at media discourse analysis, particularly in the light of the difficulties posed by the relations between the press and the military in Britain (McCartney).
3 Sepoy is a term used to call an Indian soldier.
4 To load the new Enfield rifle, the sepoys had to bite off the ends of lubricated cartridges.
5 Soldiers of the Indian imperial army became eligible for the award only from 1911. Gurkhas were awarded 26 Victoria Crosses of which thirteen belong British officers and thirteen to Nepalese. All, save one won in 1965, were awarded to the Nepalese soldiers in World War I and World War II.

6 The Tripartite Agreement stated that the Gurkhas had to return to Nepal after service without rights to settle in the United Kingdom and that their pensions had to be in line with the amounts paid to Gurkha pensioners of the Indian Army.

7 For instance Gurkha Army Ex-Servicemen’s Organization (GAESO), United British Gurkhas Ex-army Association (UBGEA), British Gurkha Welfare Society (BGWS), British Council of Gurkhas (BCG), Gurkha Satyagraha Committee, Howe & Co Solicitors.

8 Joanna Lumley’s family history includes military service in the British India while her father served in the 6th Gurkha Rifles. She became the public face of the campaign frequently appearing the press and TV shows, leading rallies, delivering speeches etc. In Britain, she is a well-known actress and an influential activist.

9 The recruitment is free as the Army does not charge the candidates for the application.

10 See: Zi Liang; Who will be a Gurkha; Chisholm.

11 Army 2020 aims at reducing regular Army numbers by 20,000 as well as adapting its structure the new situation. The process will involve: merging and moving units; returning troops from Germany and Afghanistan, integrating the new reserve forces into a single army as well as introducing new equipment (Morse 4).

12 All candidates have to present School Leaving Certificates (SLCs) which they earn after successfully passing the final examination in the secondary school system (“Recruit registration Gurkhas”).

13 27.8 per cent of GDP in 2017 according to the World Bank (“Personal remittances, received (% of GDP)”).

References


https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-8175
https://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP7930


https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/21/gurkhas-granted-right-to-settle-in-uk


https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1989-06-08/debates/43a89b7f-dec7-49da-ab78-ffd7d87e4e27/TheArmy?highlight=future%20gurkhas%20report#contribution-e20b9ace-cbe5-41a9-a578-c26d3875e2d9
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1995-10-16/debates/4a10ef05-4a1e-43dd-a01b-06a66b76e9d3/FirstDay

https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1999-07-01/debates/9e21d5ad-98b8-4d20-b22e-92443c155a3e/ArmedForcesPersonnel?highlight=strategic%20defence%20review%20gurkhas#contribution-e0ed16f7-0ef2-4c54-8810-a1087f644f0a


https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2018-11-22/debates/16D519BA-957F-4B8B-BE0C-DFC5E7E9983C/ArmedForcesCovenant?highlight=gurkha%20sas#contribution-D5AECA81-9715-42FF-9D5E-FA614A133070


https://stories.forces.net/becoming-a-gurkha/


https://www.jstor.org/stable/40664074

“Manning the Army.” 2018. *In Front: British Army Newsletter* 1.
https://www.army.mod.uk/media/5001/in_front_issue_1_internet.pdf

https://www.jstor.org/stable/4408220


https://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/himal/pdf/Himal_4_3.pdf

https://www.gurkhabde.com/photo-galleries/10877/


“Personal remittances, received (% of GDP).” The World Bank.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS


https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/brigade-of-gurkhas/gurkha-recruitment/recruit-registration/


https://fissilematerials.org/library/mod98.pdf

https://www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/0207sdrvoll.pdf


**Filmography**

  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oONS6u-LO58


  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m7Dlz7CcMXk